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The RICO Trusteeships after Twenty Years: A Progress Report
James B. Jacobs, Eileen M. Cunningham, and Kimberly Friday*
The use of federal civil RICO1 suits to purge organized crime from international, regional, and local unions is one of the most ambitious efforts at directing sociolegal change in U.S. history.2 Since the first case, United States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters3 in 1982, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has ﬁled twenty such suits against unions that typically have been dominated, sometimes for decades, by La Cosa Nostra (LCN) organized crime
*Mr. Jacobs is Chief Justice Warren E. Burger professor of Constitutional Law and the Courts and Director, Center for Research in Crime and Justice, New York University School of Law. Ms. Cunningham and Ms. Friday are third year law students at New York University School of Law. The authors wish to thank Robert Stewart, the co-teacher of our fall 2002 seminar on Labor Racketeering and Union Democracy. He shared his vast knowledge and experience but cannot be held responsible for our errors.
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. �� 1961�68 (2000).
2. The Attorney General has authority to sue for equitable relief to prevent violation of RICO under 18 U.S.C. � 1964(a), which provides:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provisions for the rights of innocent persons.
The government�s attack on labor racketeering has a long history, going back to Thomas Dewey and even earlier. However, the modern attack on labor racketeering dates to the mid1970s and is inextricably connected to the general attack on organized crime. See JAMES B. JACOBS ET AL., BUSTING THE MOB: UNITED STATES V COSA NOSTRA (1994).In the early 1970s, the FBI and DOJ attacks on organized crime focused on organized crime�s role in gambling. But that effort faltered, perhaps because judges and the public could not get excited about exposing gamblers. After the assassination of Jimmy Hoffa in 1975 (immediately labeled a �mob hit�), the organized crime control effort started to focus intensely on organized crime�s role in labor racketeering. That focus was reinforced by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee�s hearings on the matter. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS, AND LABOR UNIONS (1985) [hereinafter THE EDGE]; James B. Jacobs & Elizabeth Mullin, Congress� Role in the Defeat of Organized Crime, 39 CRIM.L. BULL. 269 (2003).
3. 581 F. Supp. 279, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2829 (D.N.J. 1984), aff �d, 780 F.2d 267, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2121 (3d Cir. 1985).
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families.4 Every one of these suits5 has resulted in a court-ordered or negotiated trusteeship;6 most of the suits and/or trusteeships have purged at least some mob connected union officials and restored at least some elements of union democracy.
There is a vast literature on the capacity of courts to successfully reform public institutions.7 However, unlike efforts to reform jails, mental hospitals, prisons, and schools through federal court litigation, the extraordinary legal effort to reform �mobbedup� local, regional, and (inter)national unions has gone practically unnoticed by legal commentators.8 Three of these DOJ civil RICO union lawsuits involve international unions that for decades have been dogged by charges of organized crime racketeering.9 From the famous U.S. Senate McClellan Committee hearings in the late 1950s, to the President�s Commission
4. See infra Table I. The most recent such suit was ﬁled in April 2002 against Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (HEREIU) Local 69 (N.D.N.Y.). Any enumeration inevitably involves some subjective judgments. For example, in 1990 the federal government brought one omnibus civil RICO suit against half a dozen International Longshoremen Association NYC area locals, the settlement of which involved three separate trusteeships. More significantly, we do not place on our list the many �derivative trusteeships� that were generated from the RICO trusteeships imposed on the three international unions. See infra Table II.
5. Only two trusteeships were imposed after trial. The first was the path-breaking case against IBT Local 560. See James B. Jacobs & David Santore, Liberation of IBT Local 560, 37 CRIM.L.BULL. 125 (2001). The second was the Philadelphia Roofers case. United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association, 686 F. Supp. 1139, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2580 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
6. We are using the term �trusteeship� generically. Sometimes the trustee is called a �monitor,� �liaison officer,� �special master,� or �ombudsman.� Some trustees have a specialized title to reflect their function, such as �investigations officer� or �elections officer.� In fact, each RICO union trusteeship has been individually created with its unique package of powers, duties, and resources.
7. See, e.g., LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265 (1983); James B. Jacobs & Kristin Stohner, Ten Years of Court Supervised Reform: A Chronicle and Assessment, 6CAL.CRIM.L. REV. 3 (2004); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1990).
8. But see Michael J. Goldberg, Derailing Union Democracy: Why Deregulation Would Be a Mistake, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP.& LAB. L. 137 (2002); Michael J. Goldberg, An Overview and Assessment of the Law Regulating Internal Union Affairs, 21 J. LAB.RES. 15 (2000); Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor�s House: Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989 DUKE L. J. 903 (1989); Clyde W. Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689 (1991); Kenneth R. Wallentine, A Leash Upon Labor: RICO Trusteeships on Labor Unions, 7HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 341 (1990).
9. See United States v. Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 (DNE) (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter IBT Int�l]; United States v. Edward T. Hanley, Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees Int�l Union, and Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees Int�l Union Gen. Executive Bd., Civ. No. 95�4596 (D.N.J. 1995) [hereinafter HEREIU Local 54]; United States v. Laborers� Int�l Union of N. Am. (consent decree reached before ﬁled) [hereinafter LIUNA Int�l]. In addition, an omnibus 1990 civil RICO suit was ﬁled against some half dozen New York/New Jersey�area locals of the International Longshoremen�s Association (ILA), an international union. See United States v. Local 295, Int�l Longshoremen�s Ass�n, No. 90 Civ. 0963. See also THE EDGE, supra note 2.
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on Organized Crime (PCOC) in 1986, to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations� many hearings in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, corruption and racketeering have been constantly exposed in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (HEREIU), and Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA).10 The 1988 RICO suit against the IBT general executive board resulted in a trusteeship that, in modified form (an �independent review board�), is still in effect.11 The DOJ drafted a RICO complaint against the LIUNA general executive board that it threatened to ﬁle; to avert this, LIUNA agreed to sign a consent decree in February 1995 that called for the implementation of a remedial plan orchestrated by a former federal prosecutor, and the government retained the option to ﬁle the consent decree in the future if the union�s compliance with the terms of the agreement faltered.12 A RICO complaint against the HEREIU general executive board was ﬁled in September 1995;13 on the same day, HEREIU and DOJ entered into a consent decree providing for a government sponsored trusteeship.14
Each of the three civil RICO suits against an international union has produced a trusteeship (or its functional equivalent) that, in turn,
10. See THE EDGE, supra note 2; James B. Jacobs & Ellen Peters, Labor Racketeering: The Maﬁa and the Unions, 30 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 229 (Michael Tonry, ed. 2003). See also Jacobs & Mullin, supra note 2.
11. On March 14, 1989, U. S. District Judge David N. Edelstein entered a consent decree in IBT Int�l that provided for the creation of an independent review board (IRB) that would begin operation after the 1991 general election for IBT officers. The IRB, which began in October 1992, succeeded the independent administrator and the investigations officer. Id. Pursuant to the Consent Order, the IRB has three members: one the Attorney General appoints; one the union appoints; and the third member is selected by the other two. Id.
12. LIUNA Int�l. (never ﬁled). Although the complaint was not ﬁled, we still include the LIUNA International case in our list of twenty since LIUNA unconditionally consented to the government ﬁling a signed consent agreement, which included a trusteeship, if it was not satisfied with the union�s internal reform effort. Id. Former DOJ prosecutor Robert Luskin has served as the general executive board (GEB) attorney for the internal reform effort. Correspondence from Robert Luskin (Nov. 2003) (on ﬁle with author). In this position, Luskin acts as an in-house prosecutor responsible for investigating and removing corrupt individuals from LIUNA. Id. Luskin hired three other officers: an inspector general to work on investigations with the GEB attorney and monitor compliance with LIUNA�s �Ethical Practices Code�; a hearing officer to act as an internal judge hearing disciplinary cases brought by the GEB Attorney; and an appellate officer hearing any appeals of the hearing officer�s decisions. Id. LIUNA also hired an Election Officer to monitor the 1996 and 2001 elections. Id.
The appointment of Douglas Gow as inspector general went a long way towards erasing the difference between this �inhouse� DOJ monitored trusteeship and a court imposed trusteeship. Before retirement, Gow had been a high-ranking FBI agent and his FBI and other law enforcement contacts assured that the LIUNA reform team would have excellent intelligence information about organized crime influence in the union.
13. HEREIU Int�l., Civ. No. 95�4596.
14. Similar allegations have been made against the International Longshoremen�s Association, but to date the DOJ has not brought a civil RICO suit against that international union. In 1990 the government brought an omnibus RICO case against a slew of the ILA�s locals with jurisdiction over the New York/New Jersey port. See United States
v. Local 1804�1, Int�l Longshoremen�s Ass�n, AFL-CIO, 732 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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has uncovered corruption and racketeering in some affiliated locals that the international has placed in trusteeship.15 Arguably these �derivative trusteeships� could be counted as RICO trusteeships since they resulted, albeit indirectly, from a DOJ civil RICO suit. Nevertheless, we have decided not to include them in Table I, infra, on the ground that �a trustee appointed solely by the union lacks the authority conferred by court appointment, does not possess subpoena power, and can be subject to charges of recrimination and political vendetta. Federal law enforcement agencies are statutorily prohibited from disclosing certain information to a union trustee or to the union�s own internal disciplinary process that is essential to any reform effort. Furthermore, the period of the trusteeship [imposed by an international union] is presumed valid only for a period of 18 months.�16
Except in two instances, all of the RICO-generated trusteeships of mob-dominated union locals involve affiliates of the IBT, ILA, LIUNA, and HEREIU;17 the two exceptions are Local 30 of the United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers Union in Philadelphia, and the Carpenters District Council in New York City.18 Moreover, almost all of the RICO cases deal with union locals in the New York City metropolitan area;19 some exceptions are the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, Roofers Local 30 in Philadelphia; HEREIU Local 54 in Atlantic City; HEREIU Local 69 in Buffalo, New York; LIUNA Chicago Laborers� District Council (CLDC); and LIUNA Local 210 in Buffalo, New York.20 Still, this pattern does not warrant the conclusion that
15. See infra Table II. IBT Int�l, No. 88 Civ. 4486; HEREIU Int�l, Civ. No. 95�4596; LIUNA Int�l, (consent decree reached before ﬁled).
16. United States of America and Laborers� Int�l Union of N. Am. by and through Robert Luskin, in his official capacity as Gen. Executive Bd. Att�y v. Constr. & Gen. Laborers� Dist. Council of Chicago and Vicinity, an affiliated entity of the Laborers� Int�l Union of N. Am., 99 C 5229 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (Compl. at 105�06). The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. �� 401�531 (2000), popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, provides relief against internal trusteeships imposed for improper purposes. Under this section, a labor organization�s trusteeship over a subordinate local union is presumed valid for a period of eighteen months from the date of its establishment. See id. � 464(c). After the expiration of eighteen months, however, the trusteeship will be presumed invalid unless the labor organization can show by clear and convincing proof that the continuation of the trusteeship is necessary. See id.
17. See infra Tables I & II.
18. United States v. Local 30, United Slate Tile and Composition Roofers, No. 87� 7718 (E.D. Pa. 1987); United States v. Dist. Council of NYC and Vicinity of the United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., No. 90 Civ. 5722 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Racketeering has been documented in other unions, such as the Union of Painters and Allied Trades, International. See, e.g., Riga v. American Painting Co., Inc., 1986 WL 9248 (E.D. Pa Aug. 25, 1986); see also Local 46 Laundry Workers (Chicago, IL), Local 110 Motion Picture Operators Union (Chicago, IL), Local 136 Machinery Movers (Chicago, IL), Local 18 Operating Engineers (Cleveland, OH), Ironworkers Local 17 (Cleveland, OH). See also PETER F. VAIRA &DOUGLAS P. ROLLER, ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE LABOR UNIONS (1978).
19. See infra Table II.
20. Local 30, United Slate Tile and Composition Roofers, No. 87�7718; United States v. Edward T. Hanley, No. 90�5017 (D.N.J. 1990); Constr. & Gen. Laborers� Dist. Council, 99 C 5229; United States v. LIUNA Local 210, No. 99 CV0915A (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
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labor racketeering is limited, for the most part, to the New York City area. A great deal of labor racketeering has been documented in Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and San Diego.21 Racketeering has been exposed in other major unions as well, including the Laundry Workers, the Motion Picture Operators Union, the Machinery Movers, the Operating Engineers, and the Ironworkers.22
Evaluating the impact of these RICO suits and trusteeships is no easy matter. A few trusteeships clearly have successfully purged the influence of organized crime and have transformed unions that had been run like dictatorships rooted in intimidation, violence, and exploitation into properly functioning organizations with competitive elections and accountability to the rank-and-file.23 Other trusteeships have failed to break the hold of the organized-crime-dominated regime.24 In the majority of cases, it is too soon to reach a definitive conclusion on success or failure.25
There is very limited systematic documentation or evaluation of the governmental and judicial effort to reform corrupted unions through civil RICO suits. For the U.S. Attorney considering what relief to ask for, for the judge contemplating what relief to grant, and for the newly appointed trustee charged with formulating a reform strategy,
21. In his affidavits for the government in the litigation against the IBT general executive board, former IBT General President Roy Williams explained that in the exercise of his previous duties as president of IBT Local 41 in Kansas City, he took directions from organized crime boss, Nick Civella. JACOBS, supra note 2, at 169. Williams claimed he did not know Civella was involved in the Maﬁa until he was taken blindfolded to a warehouse and threatened with harm to himself and his family. Id. at 189�90. Williams went to Jimmy Hoffa for advice, and Hoffa reportedly told him, ��Roy, it�s a bad situation . . . You can run, but you can�t hide. My advice to you is to cooperate or get your family killed. Roy, these are bad people. And they were here a long time before you and me came. And they�ll be here a long time after we�re gone. They�ve infiltrated into every big local union, every conference and pension fund�even the AFL-CIO! I�m tied as tight as I can be.�� Id. at 190�91. See also JAMES NEFF, MOBBED UP: JACKIE PRESSER�S HIGH-WIRE LIFE IN THE TEAMSTERS, THE MAFIA, AND THE FBI (1989) (providing extensive information about organized-crime-sponsored labor racketeering in Cleveland, Detroit, and Kansas City); 132 CONG.REC. S. 10909 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1986).
22. VAIRA &ROLLER, supra note 18.
23. The clearest cases of success are the trusteeships of HEREIU Local 54 (Atlantic City) and the Mason Tenders District Council of Greater New York. Telephone interview with James Flanagan ( July 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author); telephone interview with Lawrence Pedowitz (Nov. 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author). Another clear case of success was IBT Local 560, where, after a long struggle, the union made an absolutely clean break from the old regime. See James B. Jacobs & David Santore, Liberation of IBT Local 560, 37 CRIM.L. BULL. 125 (2001).
24. Remedial trusteeships have failed most clearly in the Philadelphia Roofers case, ILA Locals cases, including Local 1588 and Local 1814, and LIUNA Local 6A case. For information about the Bruno/Scarfo family in Philadelphia and Atlantic City, see THE EDGE, supra note 2, at 76�81; JOHN GUINTHER &FRANCIS FRIEL, BREAKING THE MOB (1990); JOSEPH SALERNO JR.& STEPHEN J. RIVELE, THE PLUMBER (1990).
25. Some progress has been made in the trusteeships over the Carpenters Union, LIUNA International, and the Chicago Laborers District Council, but we would not conclude that success has been achieved. See Jacobs & Stohner, supra note 7.
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there is no best practices manual, no compendium of past judicial orders and consent decrees, and no explanation, much less critique, of the varied strategies that have been tried in the past. There is no academic scholarship or government report on how to define and measure success in reforming a mob-dominated union.
This article seeks to begin the arduous process of assessing the extraordinary and ongoing twenty-year history of civil RICO litigation aimed at reforming mobbed-up unions. First, it seeks to identify all the RICO cases and trusteeships. Second, it begins to collect information on key variables that may determine success or failure. Third, it attempts to initiate discussion on evaluating RICO-generated union trusteeships.
I. The Trustees
In the majority of cases, formal selection of the trustee has been left up to the presiding judge, with both the government and the union making recommendations. In almost all cases, one of the government�s nominees has been chosen;26 no trustee has been appointed over the government�s objection.27 Often the trustee is appointed after the consent agreement has been ﬁled with the court; however, in some cases the trustee has been explicitly named in the consent agreement itself. For example, the NYC District Council of Carpenters� consent decree named both the investigations and review officer (IRO) and the members of the Independent Hearing Committee.28
One of the most arresting facts about the government�s twenty-year legal attack on labor racketeering is that the trustees, chosen to reform mob-controlled unions, are almost all former federal prosecutors, usually with experience investigating and prosecuting organized crime.29 For example, Ed Stier, trustee for ten years in the first civil RICO labor racketeering case, had previously been both a state and
26. In the Chicago Laborers� District Council case, for example, Robert Bloch, formally nominated by LIUNA International, had the DOJ�s strong support and approval. See NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE (Sept. 10, 2001). Similarly, in the LIUNA Local 210 case, the international union appointed Gabriel Rosetti to be the trustee; the DOJ then consented to have Rosetti serve as RICO trustee as well. Stephanie Mencimer, Ex-FBI official Pulls at Union�s Infamous Roots; Laborers Fight Corruption from the Inside Out, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at A1.
27. For example, in the HEREIU Int�l case, the judge received three names from the government and three from HEREIU. HEREIU�s nominees were allies of president Edward Hanley. The government told the judge that if one of the union�s nominees was chosen, the government would cease cooperating and would prosecute the suit. One of the government�s suggestions, Kurt Muellenberg, a former head of the DOJ�s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, was appointed. Interview with anonymous Department of Labor official (Aug. 7, 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author).
28. Consent decree, District Council of Carpenters (March 4, 1994); United States
v. Dist. Council, 778 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Dist. Council, 941 F. Supp. 349, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
29. See infra Table III.
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federal prosecutor.30 Thomas Puccio, trustee in the IBT Local 295 case, was former head of the federal Organized Crime Strike Force in Brooklyn.31 Of the three members of the Independent Review Board in the IBT International case, one, William H. Webster, was a former FBI director, another, Charles Carberry, a former assistant United States attorney, and the third, Michael Holland, the elections monitor, a labor lawyer.32 Kurt Muellenberg, former head of the Department of Justice�s Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, served as trustee in the HEREIU International case, and is currently serving as trustee in the HEREIU Local 69 case.33 Only a few, like Gabriel Rosetti Jr. in LIUNA Local 210 and Robert Bloch in the Chicago Laborers� District Council (CLDC), had significant prior experience in labor law.34
It is not surprising that former federal prosecutors should be chosen as trustees in civil RICO cases involving labor racketeering. These cases, while civil in form, are part and parcel of federal law enforcement�s attack on organized crime. These labor racketeering cases are won in the remedial phase, not at the trial or with a favorable decree. The prosecutors have a clear idea of what they want to accomplish� the eradication of organized crime elements from the union and the establishment of healthy union governance that will resist future
30. Harold Ackerman first chose Joel Jacobson, a career union official, to be the Local 560 trustee. See Jacobs & Santore, supra note 5. After a year, Judge Ackerman replaced Jacobson because he had not moved vigorously to purge organized crime figures and their associates from the union. See id. Perhaps Judge Ackerman�s unhappy experience with a trustee drawn from the ranks of organized labor influenced decision makers in later cases to choose their trustees from the ranks of former federal prosecutors.
31. See Tom Robbins, The Clean-Up Man: Chic Ex-Prosecutor Makes a Bundle Overseeing Teamsters Local, VILLAGE VOICE, April 18, 2001.
32. Jacobs & Peters, supra note 10, at 245, 247. In addition, Holland was the first elections officer in the triumvirate trusteeship appointed to implement the consent decree in the IBT Int�l case. Holland�s successor was Barbara Quindel, a labor lawyer. Hearings on Invalidated 1996 Teamster Election: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 254�60 (1997). See Table III infra.
33. However, a few trustees have been drawn from the ranks of those with other backgrounds. James Flanagan, the trustee for HEREIU Local 54, was a former deputy director of the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement. Flanagan, supra note 23. It is notable that the Division of Gaming Enforcement was authorized to certify unions involved in the Atlantic City gaming industry as free of corruption and racketeering as part of the attempt to keep organized crime out of Atlantic City casinos. Id. This position, therefore, gave Flanagan considerable knowledge of unions and labor law, and contacts within the FBI and Department of Labor. Id. Gabriel Rosetti, Jr. the trustee for LIUNA Local 210, was a LIUNA member for over thirty years. Mencimer, supra note 26, at A1. Robert E. Bloch, the trustee for the LIUNA Chicago Laborer�s District Council, was an attorney in private practice who had previously served as counsel to LIUNA International. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE (Aug. 16, 1999). However, Bloch was assisted in his trusteeship by another court-appointed monitor, Steven Miller, who had previously served as the chief of the Special Prosecutions Section of the U.S. Attorney�s Ofﬁce for the Northern District of Illinois. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., supra note 26.
34. Mencimer, supra note 26, at A1; NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., supra note 33.
intrusions by racketeers. But how to get there is less clear, varying with the particular facts of each situation. Thus, the federal prosecutors press for appointment of a trustee in whom they have complete confidence; that means a person who understands organized crime and who can work smoothly with the FBI and Labor Department35 investigators.36
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II. The Duration of the Trusteeship
The DOJ rarely, if ever, favors a limit on the RICO trusteeship�s duration. The union defendant will always resist a trusteeship of indefinite duration�if for no other reason than the shorter the trusteeship, the less financial drain on the union. In a few cases, the decree or consent agreement left the trusteeship�s duration indefinite.37 The advantage of establishing a trusteeship with no fixed duration is that the criminal elements in the union will have no cause to believe that if they are patient, the trustee will disappear and things will revert to business as usual. Similarly, the rank-and-ﬁle will have reason to believe that the trusteeship will remain in place until corruption and racketeering have been thoroughly eradicated. The disadvantage is that, without a fixed termination date, the trustee might operate without any sense of urgency, thereby draining the union treasury and preventing the return of the union to independence and self-governance. Furthermore, without a fixed or at least presumptive date of termination, it may be difﬁcult to close down the trusteeship. There are always reasons to extend oversight and supervision just a little bit longer. Some prison and jail trusteeships, operating according to a similar logic, have lasted for decades.38
In the majority of labor racketeering cases, the court�s decree or
35. The Ofﬁce of Labor Racketeering, in the U.S. Department of Labor�s Inspector General Ofﬁce, provides DOL investigators to labor racketeering investigations. See OFFICE OF LABOR RACKET. AND FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP�T OF LABOR, at http://www.oig.dol.gov/public/programs/oi/main.htm (last visited March 29, 2004).
36. HEREIU International trustee and later HEREIU Local 69 trustee Kurt Muellenberg explained, �The investigators are part of the old boy network of retired FBI agents. A trustee needs to have a fair amount of experience to deal with investigators who might go a little overboard�they need the power of persuasion to rein them in.� Interview with Kurt Muellenberg (Nov. 7, 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author).
37. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1174; Consent decree, United States v. Laborers� International Union of North America (1995); see also NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE ( Jan. 31, 2000).
38. For a good summary of the history of trusteeships resulting from constitutional litigation over conditions of confinement in U.S. prisons and jails, see generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY &EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA�S PRISONS (1998); COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS (John J. Dilulio, Jr., ed., 1990); Susan Sturm, Special Masters Aid in Compliance Efforts, NAT�L PRISON PROJECT J. 9 (Winter 1985).
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 427
the consent agreement provided that the trusteeship would last for a fixed amount of time, ranging from as little as eighteen months in the cases of HEREIU International and HEREIU Local 100, to as much as six years, as in the case of HEREIU Local 54.39 Most of the decree/ consent agreements have included an option to extend the trusteeship, at least once, for a further fixed term.40
Of the twenty civil RICO suits against unions resulting in trusteeships, several have been wholly terminated, including IBT Local 560, HEREIU International, HEREIU Locals 54 and 100, the Mason Tenders District Council, the Chicago Laborers� District Council, LIUNA Local 64, and the Roofers Local 30/30A.41 Several trusteeships, such as those on LIUNA International, HEREIU Local 69, and IBT Local 282, are ongoing.42 One methodological problem confronting an evaluator is when to consider a trusteeship terminated, since courts may continue some kind of oversight under a different type of monitor. For example, in the Mason Tenders District Council case, the trusteeship was terminated after four years, but a final agreement appointed the former trustee as a review monitor for a thirty-six month term.43 Similarly, the HEREIU International trusteeship was succeeded by a three person review board.44
III. The Trustee�s Powers
The trustee�s powers emanate from the court�s order/decree or from the court-approved consent agreement. In some cases, consent decrees have given the trustee all the powers of all the union�s officers, in effect, the power to administer the union, including negotiating contracts, handling grievances, and initiating collective action, including strikes.45 This type of all-powerful trusteeship, resembling the trustee
39. See infra Table IV.
40. The Philadelphia Roofers Local 30/30B decree established a �decreeship� with an indefinite term. Judge Bechtle believed that success could be achieved only by convincing the rank-and-file and the racketeers that court supervision would last as long as necessary to solve the problem. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1163, 1168.
41. See infra Table IV.
42. See infra Table IV.
43. United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater New York, 1994 WL 742637 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1994).
44. HEREIU Int�l, Civ. No. 95�4596; see also Union Democracy, Part VII: Government Supervision of the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 18�19 (1999) (statement of Kurt W. Muellenberg, Esq., former monitor of the HEREIU).
45. For example, Trustee Robert Bloch in the Chicago Laborers District Council trusteeship negotiated a new three-year labor contract that provided for higher wages, better benefits, and, for the first time, a grievance procedure. Press Release, U.S. Dep�t of Justice, Consent Decree Allows Federal Court to Supervise Purge of Organized Crime from 19,000 Member Chicago Laborers� Council (Aug. 12, 1999).
428 The Labor Lawyer 428 (2004)
in a corporate bankruptcy, might not be effective in the union context;46 the trustee has to spend a high percentage of time keeping the union going rather than working on organizational reform.47 On the other hand, the all-powerful trustee is in a position to earn the confidence of the rank-and-file by administering the union to his or her advantage. The trustee will be assisting the membership to achieve its goals rather than functioning solely as a policeman. If the budget permits, trustees who find themselves in this position usually hire a seasoned union official to handle the day-to-day running of the union, while the trustee concentrates on investigations, discipline, elections, and communications with the rank-and-file. Where the trustee could not, or would not, delegate administrative responsibilities, the trusteeship foundered.48
Obviously, too little authority can doom a trusteeship.49 Trustees need the power to remove from union ofﬁce, subject to court review, and to expel from the union, those officers who have embezzled union funds, taken bribes from employers, and are members or associates of, or who knowingly associate with, members or associates of organized crime.50
The consent decree in the IBT International case gave the Trustee Administrator the authority of the IBT general president solely in the area of discipline.51 As per the IBT constitution, this was sufficient
46. In liquidations under the Bankruptcy Code, it is routine for trustees to be appointed in order to protect the liquidating company�s assets and the interests of lawful creditors. See 11 U.S.C. �� 701�704 (2000). Trustees are less often appointed in Chapter 11 reorganizations, but they may be appointed where there is a threat of management fraud or gross incompetence. See 11 U.S.C. �� 1104�1108 (2000).
47. In the LIUNA Local 6A trusteeship, Trustee Eugene Anderson and his assistant, Robert Gaynor, spent so much time supervising the daily administration of the union that they didn�t have time to interact directly with union members. Eugene Kiely, Local 560: Proof Is in the Vote; Election Is Test of U.S. Efforts to Clean Up Teamsters, THE RECORD, Nov. 27, 1988, at A2. It is difﬁcult, Gaynor said, �to gain their confidence and convince some to take an active role in the union.� Id.
48. In the Philadelphia Roofers Local 30/30B case, Robert Welsh was the only person responsible for enforcing the court�s decree. United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO v. Composition Roofers Union, Local 30, United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, 2003 WL 2125067 at *3 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 2003). This trusteeship was far from successful; the International had to impose an emergency trusteeship only two years after the court imposed decreeship ended.
49. One of the weakest trusteeships (in terms of legal basis) was the Philadelphia Roofers Local 30/30B case. There, the decree provided the monitor with the power to oversee negotiations, but not take part, and granted no power to remove corrupt members of the union. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1172�73. The judge did not want to displace the elected union officials� responsibility to run the union all together. Id. at 1168. �The court [is] . . . leaving the Union institution and its present leadership in place, but . . . removing from Union control those areas of activity which the Union has misused in the past.� Id.
50. Trusteeships have differed with respect to allocating the authority to decide whether an officer or member has knowingly associated with members or associates of organized crime. Though this power has been challenged on the ground that it violates freedom of association and smacks of totalitarianism, the power itself has been upheld in every case.
51. United States v. Local 1804�1, at 4�5 (consent judgment for Local 1804�1).
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 429
authority to expel union members, not just officers, for bringing dishonor and disrepute to the Teamsters.52 Judge Edelstein agreed; the Second Circuit affirmed.53
The trustees in the LIUNA Local 6A and HEREIU Local 54 cases had authority to bar from union elections candidates who knowingly associated with organized crime figures, but lacked power to expel such individuals from the union.54 Disappointed ofﬁce seekers continued to influence other union members and to turn up at union meetings, thereby sustaining the atmosphere of intimidation that had prevailed for decades.55
The flip side of the power to ﬁre and expel is the power to hire and appoint. The union trustees have usually had the power to hire members of the union staff, including, importantly, business agents.56 The trustee can demonstrate that a new regime is in place. Cleaning house is an important signal of a clean break with the past. It also provides opportunities for new leadership. The danger is that making snap hiring decisions risks appointing people who are incompetent, unpopular, or otherwise not likely to be effective leaders. Another problem is that the rank-and-file may deeply resent having their officers chosen, or imposed, by �the government.� officers chosen in this way, seen as �government men,� have not been able to function effectively. It is therefore highly desirable for the union members themselves to be involved in selecting new officers.
Trustees typically have the authority to examine all books and records, and to compel sworn statements by officers, agents, representatives, employees, and members. In many cases the trustees have authority to review all contracts or proposed contracts and to veto improper expenditures.57 The corrupt regime may have accelerated its contracts with cronies before the trustee assumed his position, in effect providing generous golden handshakes to as many members of the hereto-fore-dominant clique as possible. The trustee must also scrutinize the
53. United States v. Int�l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 745 F. Supp. 908, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3079 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff �d, 941 F.2d 1292, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2219 (2d Cir. 1991).
54. See United States v. Local 6A, 86 Civ. 4819 (1987); United States v. Hanley, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22192 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 1992) (affirming Monitor�s decision to ban certain candidates from elections, but declining to expel the candidates from the union), aff �d, United States v. Hanley, 6 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 1993).
55. Flanagan, supra note 23.
56. Organizers recruit, organize employees, and perform certain election-related tasks. Business agents represent Union members. Their responsibilities include negotiating labor contracts, administering the grievance-arbitration process, ﬁling unfair labor charges, and making decisions regarding strikes and other actions against employers.
57. In the case of Roofers Local 30/30B, Judge Bechtle�s decree stated, �[t]he court will establish direct control of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Union that require the expenditure of any funds of the Union or any affiliated entity for the transfer of any of its assets.� Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1172.
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payroll for no-show workers, improper reimbursements, and other fraudulent expenditures.
In some cases, the power to bring suit on behalf of the union has enabled trustees to obtain reimbursement for exploitations of the union�s assets. For example, in the Mason Tenders District Council case, Monitor Lawrence Pedowitz ﬁled lawsuits against former officers and trustees, recovering $12 million of the $15 million in assets lost due to their malfeasance.58 Ron DePetris, trustee over IBT Local 851, also recovered money for that local.59 These two cases strongly suggest that every trustee should have the authority to sue those who have victimized the union and its pension and welfare funds. Such suits enable the trustee to gain credibility with the rank-and-file.
RICO trustees are almost always empowered to implement and monitor elections. Holding a fair and competitive election is an important step in the union�s rehabilitation process. In many mob-dominated unions, there has not been a fair election in the memory of any living union member.60 The trustee must promulgate rules for candidates getting on the ballot as well as voting procedures.61
IV. The Terms of the Trustee�s Employment62
At first blush, it might seem advantageous to have a fulltime trustee, given the enormous challenge of reforming a corrupted union. However, it is very difﬁcult to recruit a fulltime trustee from the ranks of private sector law firm attorneys with prior federal prosecutorial or organized crime control experience. The attorney would have to take an extended or indefinite leave from his or her law firm and perhaps a diminution in pay. More importantly, a union trusteeship is not a step
58. Impediments to Union Democracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 79�87 (1998) (statement of Michael S. Bearse, General Counsel, LIUNA).
59. DePetris, seeking to recover Local IBT 851 assets that had been dissipated and misappropriated, ﬁled two civil RICO claims against freight-forwarding companies and Local 851�s former secretary-treasurer. JAMES B. JACOBS, GOTHAM UNBOUND 172�74 (1999). This was the first time a court-appointed monitor initiated a suit to recover civil damages on behalf of a labor union for past corruption. Id. DePetris settled for more than $3 million for the financially struggling union. Id.
60. While the 1995 rank-and-file election of the New York District Council of Carpenters officers was the first in 121 years, it resulted in the reelection of the incumbent officers. See Kenneth C. Crowe, Hammering Away at the Incumbent, NEWSDAY, July 18, 1995, at A31.
61. The election rules have special significance for unions with a history of racketeering. As Judge Edelstein commented, �election rules must not be viewed in a vacuum, but instead placed in their proper context. This Court has reiterated that the [IBT] Consent Decree is a unique attempt to cleanse this union. These election rules are the linchpin in that effort. This Court will only approve election rules that will guarantee honest, fair, and free elections completely secure from harassment, intimidation, coercion, hooliganism, threats, or any variant of these, no matter under what guise.� United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 742 F. Supp. 94, 97, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3178 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
62. See infra Table VI.
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 431
along a career path. Years later, when the trusteeship is terminated, the lawyer/trustee would have to reconnect with his old firm or find a new one. There would be no business and no clients to bring to the firm. He certainly could not count on being appointed trustee in another labor racketeering case since there are few such cases and the judges and U.S. Attorneys often prefer to appoint someone they know.63 Realistically, if the RICO suits required fulltime trustees, they would have to look to another pool, perhaps retired prosecutors, or more likely career union officials; the latter would not enjoy the trust and support of federal law enforcement agents, who probably would not share investigative information with them.64 Thus, the trustees mostly serve on a part-time basis, compensated at an hourly rate. Hours per week might vary from thirty or more at the beginning of the trusteeship to ten or less as the trusteeship matures, the specific number of hours left to the trustee�s discretion.65
Compensation is an important issue. Big firm lawyers bill their time at $200�$500 per hour, rates that are staggering to union members. Some of the trustees have earned as much as $250,000 per year for their work as part-time trustees.66 Ironically, trustee compensation occasionally exceeds the salaries of the allegedly corrupt union officials whom the RICO prosecutors condemned as receiving bloated and unjustified salaries indicative of racketeering.67 The trustee�s wages have often drawn criticism from those who oppose the trusteeship on other grounds, and in some cases, may have undermined the trustee�s legitimacy in the eyes of the union�s members.68 For example,
63. Interview with anonymous Department of Labor official (Aug. 7, 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author).
64. The failure of Joel Jacobson, the first trustee in the Local 560 case, to function effectively serves as an example. However, officials have often served effectively as �deputy� monitors that aid the trustee with the day-to-day running of the union and relations with the rank-and-file. For example, Steve Hammond, a longtime LIUNA member, served in this capacity in the MTDC trusteeship, and Henry Tamarin, a HEREIU vice president, served in this capacity in the HEREIU Local 100 trusteeship. See Mason Tenders Local 59 v. Laborers� Int�l Union of N. Am., 924 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Interview with Mary Shannon Little, court officer for the Local 100 trusteeship (Nov. 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author). Another example is Frank Jackiewicz, a retired official of New Jersey Teamsters Local 843 and former secretary and chief contract negotiator of the Brewery Workers joint local executive board of New Jersey. Jackiewicz was appointed by Judge Ackerman to assist Ed Stier in the day-to-day administration of IBT Local 560. STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra note 23, at 367.
65. The trustee typically has to present his weekly or monthly billing to the judge for approval, but we know of no case of a judge rejecting the trustee�s bill; doing so might be tantamount to a vote of no confidence requiring the trustee�s resignation. The trustee himself decides how many hours are necessary.
66. According to Carl Biers, Kurt Muellenberg made $296,000 a year for his work during the HEREIU trusteeship. Carl Biers, Monitor Airs Hotel Union�s Dirty Linen, UNION DEMOCRACY REV. NO. 121.
67. Robbins, supra note 31, at 22.
68. For an extreme example of this kind of criticism, see id.
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the IBT went to court to protest the $350 hourly rate billed by Frederick Lacey as �administrator� in the triumvirate trusteeship in the IBT International case.69
The trusteeship�s budget typically involves more than just the trustee�s wages. Trustees are usually authorized to hire fulltime or part-time staff and consultants. Not uncommonly, the lawyer-trustee hires a law firm associate as an assistant.70 In some cases, the international union assigns an officer, acceptable to the trustee, to assist with collective bargaining, grievance handling, and routine administration while the trustee concentrates on audits, investigations, and elections.71
One would expect that a trusteeship over an international union�s central ofﬁce and administrative appointees would require more time, personnel, and resources than a trusteeship over a local union. Certainly, that intuition is confirmed in the case of the IBT International trusteeship that originally was comprised of three trustees and their staffs.72 After 1992, a three-person Independent Review Board (IRB) involved a fairly large scale operation including the continuation of the original investigations officer who, under the IRB, has a staff of two fulltime lawyers and six to eight fulltime investigators.73 According to IBT general president James P. Hoffa, IRB costs the IBT approximately $8�9 million per year.74 LIUNA estimates that it spends $5 million per year on the remediation effort led by Robert Luskin, plus a hearings officer and appeals officer.75 By contrast, the trusteeship over the HEREIU International�s central ofﬁce was a much smaller and cheaper operation.76
69. United States v. Int�l B�hd. of Teamsters, 1992 WL 297489, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2430 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1992).
70. Eugene Anderson (LIUNA Local 6A) hired his law firm associate, Ronald Gaynor, to assist him. Interview with Eugene Anderson (Aug. 5, 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author). Robert Bloch, the CLDC trustee, named a law firm partner to an important position in the Chicago Laborers� Pension Fund. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., supra note 33.
71. For example, in the Mason Tenders District Council case, LIUNA officer Steve Hammond assisted Lawrence Pedowitz. See Mason Tenders Local 59, 924 F. Supp. 528. Similarly, in the HEREIU Local 100 case, Henry Tamarin, a HEREIU vice resident, assisted monitor Mary Shannon Little. Little, supra note 64. Tamarin also assisted trustee James Flanagan in the reform of HEREIU Local 54 in Atlantic City. Flanagan, supra note 23.
72. STIER, ANDERSON & MALONE, LLC, supra note 23, at 305.
73. Id. at 302.
74. Steven Greenhouse, Teamsters Push to End Decade of Supervision, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1999, at A1 (stating that the trusteeship had cost the IBT $82 million, or about $8�9 million per year).
75. The internal reform process had cost about $35 million by September 1999. Mark Murray, Labor on Patrol, NAT�L J., Sept. 4, 1999, at 2489.
76. Kurt Muellenberg, retired from the Department of Justice and not seeking a second career in the private sector, agreed to a $190 hourly rate. Muellenberg, supra note 36.
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 433
Covering the costs of a RICO trusteeship often presents a major problem.77 The trusteeship is installed over a union whose coffers have been plundered by racketeers and by litigation costs. Generously funding the trusteeship could bankrupt the union or require dues increases that would cause the rank-and-file to abandon it. In a few cases, financial assistance has been obtained from the international union, a much deeper pocket.78 However, some trusteeships have foundered due to inadequate funding (e.g., LIUNA Local 6A).
V. The Trustee�s Training
Ideally, a new trustee should have general knowledge about organized crime, labor unions, labor racketeering, and, very importantly, the history of previous efforts to reform mob-dominated unions. He should also know about the specifics of the case at hand: the history and politics of the targeted union, its relationship to its International and to the employers for whom its rank-and-file work, and, most importantly, who the racketeers are and the means by which they have dominated and exploited the union, its pension and welfare funds, and its membership.
One does not learn about labor racketeering in law school.79 Indeed, the subject is barely, if at all, touched on in standard labor law courses. While there are a few books on the history of labor racketeering,80the literature is remarkably thin, given the durability of the problem. There is no manual on how to reform a corrupted union local, district council, or International or on how to organize and implement a trusteeship.
There has been surprisingly little formal or informal contact among the trustees. Indeed, Judge Bechtle in the notorious Roofers Local 30/30B case in Philadelphia instructed his trustee (liaison officer)
77. In this respect, union trusteeships differ from prison trusteeships. In the prison cases, the judge is dealing with a department of state government that can much more easily absorb the costs of a trusteeship than a beleaguered local union. Moreover, a judge could more easily hold a state officer in contempt for failing to pay the trustee to bring prison conditions to a constitutional level than hold someone in the union in contempt for not being able to come up with enough funds.
78. For example, the IBT Local 851 decree states that while the local must set up a fund from which the trustee can draw, the International will add to the fund where necessary. Consent decree, United States v. Int�l B�hd. of Teamsters Local 851 (consent decree reached before ﬁled) (Sept. 12, 1995).
79. To our knowledge, Professor Jacobs� (with retired DOJ prosecutor Robert Stewart) NYU School of Law seminar in fall term 2002 is the only seminar on the subject to be offered at a law school.
80. See NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY (1988); JOHN HUTCHINSON, THE IMPERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS (1970); PHILIP TAFT, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1958); SIDNEY LENS, THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN LABOR (1959); MALCOLM JOHNSON, CRIME ON THE LABOR FRONT (1950); HAROLD SEIDMAN, LABOR CZARS (1938).
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not to have contact with trustees in other cases lest their mistakes infect the Roofers� remediation.81 Remarkably, no conference has ever been convened to �debrief � the trustees and to memorialize their experiences. Because the trustees are, to some extent, in a competitive situation with respect to future appointments, they may be reluctant to talk about their trusteeships, especially while they are ongoing. They also may feel bound not to reveal information that law enforcement agents, prosecutors, or the judge consider confidential. Their reports have not been assembled in any retrievable way and, in our experience, are usually difﬁcult to obtain. Thus, it is likely that a new trustee would be unaware of what strategies have succeeded and failed in previous cases.
Typically, the newly appointed trustee is briefed by the federal prosecutors who have investigated the union and drafted the complaint, but the �briefing� may be no more than one or more informal discussions over lunch. Of course, the newly appointed trustee can read the RICO complaint and the settlement agreement and any other available legal documents, including previous indictments. Because practically all of the suits have settled before trial, there are no trial transcripts and rarely pretrial depositions. Still, the new trustee will assume his role with a clear understanding of the prosecutors� perception of the problem, or, more accurately, of the symptoms of the problem�e.g., mob influence, bloated salaries, ghost employees, and missing funds. What the prosecutors may not be able to convey, because they themselves may not know much about it, is the union�s politics, culture, and organizational environment, including the nature of the parent union and of the employers for whom the rank-and-file work.
It is unlikely that the judge will be able to add much to the prosecutors� briefing because the union trusteeships almost always result from negotiated settlements. Without a trial, the judge herself will not be well-versed in the union�s problems, except as presented by the prosecutors, and the judge may be insufficiently involved in the case to take much �ownership� over the structure and strategy of the trusteeship which, to a large extent, is negotiated by the parties.82
In the few instances where civil RICO suits against unions have gone to trial, the judge has had significant influence over the trusteeship. After a yearlong trial in the IBT Local 560 case, Judge Harold Ackerman, appalled by the history of the union�s corruption and racketeering,
81. Telephone interview with Robert Welsh, special master, Roofers Local 30/30B, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Nov. 25, 2003) (notes on ﬁle with author).
82. One striking exception is Judge David Edelstein, who, despite presiding over a consent agreement in IBT Int�l, became absolutely committed to reforming the IBT. Judge Edelstein supported the government�s interpretation of the agreement in dozens of decisions and in some cases rejected the government�s position because it was not strong enough (such as with the government proposed rules for the 2001 election).
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 435
became strongly committed to the trusteeship�s success.83 Judge Ackerman characterized the case in the following way: �Beneath the relatively sterile language of a dry legal opinion is a harrowing tale of how evil men, sponsored by and part of organized criminal elements, infiltrated and ultimately captured Local 560.�84
The trustee, for good reason, is likely to be suspicious of existing union officers. After all, these officials, if not part of the corrupt clique that exploited the union for many years, may have been complicit with, or at least acquiesced in the interests of, the labor racketeers. The integrity of the International union�s officers will also be uncertain. If the rank-and-file see the new trustee �cozy up� to the national officers, much less the local officers, they may quickly conclude that the trusteeship is just for show and that nothing will change.
In a few cases, the new union trustee has been approached by rank-and-file members, usually �dissidents,� who have been bold enough to challenge the ruling clique publicly. While some dissidents undoubtedly convey useful information, others have their own axe to grind; the savvy trustee needs to evaluate all allegations and tips very cautiously.
If the trustee is going to learn more about the union, particularly about corrupt individuals and schemes, the information will probably have to come from DOL and FBI investigators, who might or might not continue working on the case after the negotiated agreement.85 On the one hand, the investigators may be strongly invested in eliminating corruption and racketeering, root and branch; on the other hand, once the settlement has been agreed to, there may be departmental pressures to move on and make new cases.86 In addition, the investigators will not share information with a trustee whom they do not completely trust.
VI. The Operation of the Trusteeships
What does a trustee in a civil RICO union case actually do to achieve the goals of the trusteeship? There is no formula or �to do� list. Every trustee, to some degree, has had to invent the job, at least to the extent of identifying and prioritizing tasks and allocating time and resources among investigations and disciplinary actions on the one hand
83. Ackerman�s personal disgust can be seen in the language he used in Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 315 (describing the situation at IBT Local 560 as a �shameful horror story.� Id. He also stated, �I have determined in this case . . . to use a judicial scalpel to excise this malignancy from this union and its members.� Id. at 283).
84. Id. at 282.
85. Roofers Monitor Robert Welsh noted that even though the judge instructed him to keep most communication between themselves, he still �spoke to the U.S. Attorney and the case agents, to find out who the players were.� Welsh, supra note 81.
86. Interview with anonymous Department of Labor official (Aug. 7, 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author).
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and union-democracy-building on the other. Since no two situations are the same (for one thing, because the decrees and consent decrees are different), it is inevitable�and desirable�that each trustee attempts to adapt her skills and authority to the exigencies of the case at hand. Moreover, a successful trustee changes priorities and reallocates time and resources as weeks, months, and years pass.
A RICO union trustee has to allocate time both to responding to problems (�problem solver�) and to pressing forward with a reform agenda (�organizational reformer�). In some of the trusteeships, the trustee was initially faced with a plethora of unresolved union administrative problems. Thus, it took time for the trustee to shift attention to organizational reform. Sometimes the problems were so great and so difﬁcult that the trustee was unable ever to move into the �organizational reform� mode.
The trustees have called and presided over regularly scheduled and special union meetings where they have, among other things, explained the trusteeship to the rank-and-file and solicited input and support. They have contributed regular columns to union magazines or newsletters or sent special letters to the membership explaining the civil RICO case, the charges against incumbent officials, and the trustee�s role. In some cases, trustees have sought to educate the rank-and-file about their Landrum-Griffin rights.87 Some trustees have maintained an open door or have met on an appointment-only basis with union members who wanted to convey their concerns or assuage their anxieties. Sorting out bona ﬁde complaints from malicious rumors and politically motivated accusations is a constant challenge.
Trustees have had to pour over books and records to determine which expenditures are legitimate and which are not. In the HEREIU International case, trustee Kurt Muellenberg found a shocking lack of
87. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. �� 401�531 (2000), provides rights for most private sector union members. The Union Member�s Bill of Rights, Title I of the LMRDA, guarantees democratic rights to all union members, such as rights to nominate candidates, vote in elections, and attend and participate in union meetings. See id. � 411(a)(1). It also grants union members the freedom of speech and assembly, including the right to criticize union officials, express any viewpoint at union meetings, distribute literature at union halls, and hold separate meetings without interference from union officials. See id. � 411(a)(2). Members are also guaranteed due process rights with respect to union discipline, including the right to specific, written charges and the right to a full and fair hearing and a decision based on the evidence. See id. � 411(a)(3). Members also have a right to receive a copy of the collective bargaining agreement covering their employment, and to inspect copies of all contracts that their local union administers. See id. � 414. Under Title IV of the LMRDA, international unions must elect officers, either by a direct vote of members or by a vote of delegates to a convention, at least every five years. See id. � 481(a). Local unions must hold secret ballot elections of officers at least every three years. See id. � 481(b). Title V governs fiduciary duties of union representatives, who are obligated to manage union business for the sole benefit of the members. See id. � 501(a)�(c).
bureaucratic rationality in the union�s organization.88 There was no table of organization, job descriptions, or administrative procedures.89 Muellenberg�s main contribution as trustee was probably his recommendations for transforming the union�s administration into a modern bureaucracy.90
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 437
The trustees have invariably been involved, at varying levels of intensity, in investigating wrongdoing and wrongdoers. A minority of trustees have had an investigator working specially for the trusteeship.91 The majority has had to depend on FBI and DOL agents, which means persuading them of one�s reliability and integrity.
Trustees have had to replace business agents and other union personnel. They have spent time setting up fair election procedures and approving individual candidates and slates. Some trustees or their assistants have negotiated collective bargaining agreements, processed workplace grievances, and led job actions.92
VII. The Complexity of Evaluation
What should we conclude about this twenty-year effort to eliminate labor racketeering? There is no point in bringing civil RICO suits seeking trusteeships if such trusteeships do not solve the problems that provoke the suits. Moreover, in order to make sound future decisions about how to attack corrupted unions and other organizations, we would like to know what, over the course of the past twenty years, worked best. What is the most valuable background for a trustee? What is the most efficient preparation for the job? How much should a trustee be compensated and by whom? What should be the trusteeship�s duration? What powers and authority should a trustee have? What remedial strategies work best? What criteria can the court use to determine whether the trusteeship has achieved its goal(s)? When should the trusteeship be terminated? Evaluating the success of the RICO union trusteeships individually and as a whole is essential but extremely complex.
88. Muellenberg, supra note 36.
91. The MTDC had its own investigations officer, Michael Chertoff. Consent decree, United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater New York, 94 Civ. 6487 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The LIUNA reform team is unique in having a four-person infrastructure for investigations and prosecutions of union members: W. Douglas Gow serves as inspector general, investigating allegations of member impropriety or fraud; Robert Luskin prosecutes disciplinary cases; Peter Vaira serves as hearing officer, deciding a member�s guilt or innocence on the basis of evidence gathered by the inspector general (as well as hearing the member�s defense); and W. Neil Eggleston serves as appellate officer, hearing appeals from rulings by the hearing officer. ORGANIZED LABOR ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., FAILURE OF LIUNA �INTERNAL REFORM EFFORT� 3, 4 ( Jan. 1999).
92. See STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra note 23; email correspondence from Edward Stier to James B. Jacobs (Mar. 3, 2004) (on ﬁle with author).
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Even the meaning of �success� is debatable. Do we mean whether the trustee achieved the goals set out in the consent decree? But what if those goals were too modest? Or too ambitious? Clearly, a trusteeship has not been successful if the union remains in the hands of or under the influence of organized crime or a clique that for many years was closely connected to organized crime. For a case to be declared successful, there would need to be the expulsion from the union of organized crime figures and their allies, competitive elections, and regime change.
At what point in time should we make a judgment on whether the trusteeship has been successful? Is it appropriate to assay success after the term first specified in the decree? Or the term as extended? Or after some fixed period like one year? Five years? Or only when the trusteeship is terminated, no matter how long that takes? Is a success a success even if it takes twenty years? To pile on more complications, it is sometimes not obvious when a trusteeship has ended. In a number of cases, while the judge has ended the original form of the trusteeship, he has continued monitoring the union through some new arrangement.93
One other important point bears mention. While it may be easy to ascertain whether some major organized crime figures have been expelled from the union, it is likely to be very difﬁcult to determine whether all mob connected persons have been expelled and whether those who have been expelled continue to exert influence over union officers. Only FBI or DOL agents may know whether such relationships continue, but even they may not know. Such relationships may be too well hidden or the agents may have ceased their monitoring because they stopped working on the case. Even if the agents believe that they know, they will not share such information with university based researchers.
With the above cautions and caveats in mind, and with the knowledge that, though sorely needed, no evaluation of the civil RICO trusteeships has ever been done, we have tried to begin our own rudimentary evaluation. For each trusteeship, we have sought to determine whether it can be confidently said that organized crime no longer controls or influences the union officials. Our conclusions are based upon interviews and questionnaire responses provided by participants (DOJ lawyers, trustees, and judges) and on our review of the paper record, including trustee reports, judicial decisions, and criminal proceedings during and after the trusteeships. Nevertheless, we emphasize that these are tentative conclusions.
93. For example, in the Mason Tenders District Council case, after the expiration of the trusteeship, a �supplemental� consent decree was entered into in January 1999 that provided that the trustee, Lawrence Pedowitz, would act as a review monitor for another thirty-six months, with power to apply to the court for restoration of his trustee powers if he concluded the union was being run corruptly. Mason Tenders, 1994 WL 742637; Pedowitz, supra note 23.
There are two criteria for determining whether success has been achieved: (1) Is there persuasive evidence that the organized crime element has been purged from the union? and (2) Has the union held at least one competitive election for its top officers?94 If we can confidently answer both questions affirmatively, we characterize the case as �clearly successful�. We reached this conclusion in four cases: the Mason Tenders District Council, HEREIU Local 54, HEREIU Local 100, and IBT Local 560. We conclude that in three other cases�Roofers Local 30/30B, LIUNA Local 6A, IBT Local 282, and the NYC District Council of Carpenters�the trusteeship has been �clearly unsuccessful.� The remaining cases, unfortunately, are still ambiguous.
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VIII. Case Studies
A. A Success Story: HEREIU Local 54 (Atlantic City)
HEREIU Local 54 [hereinafter Local 54] represents hotel and restaurant workers in the Atlantic City area. The passage of the New Jersey Casino Control Act,95 which brought casino gambling to Atlantic City, swelled Local 54�s ranks.96 The union�s annual dues collection catapulted from $269,000 in 1979 to $1,389,000 in 1982.97 In 1979, Frank Gerace was appointed president of Local 54 to replace Ralph Natale, an associate of the Philadelphia Bruno LCN crime family, who was convicted and sentenced to thirty years� imprisonment for drug trafficking and other offenses.98 Gerace was alleged to be an associate of Nicodemo Scarfo, the Bruno LCN crime family capo in control of the Atlantic City area.99
In 1981, the New Jersey Casino Control Commission and the Division of Gaming Enforcement began an investigation to determine if Local 54 should be approved to represent casino employees.100 It concluded that Scarfo controlled the local, and ordered that unless Gerace and two others were removed from union ofﬁce, Local 54 would be prohibited from collecting dues�essentially a death sentence for a union.101 After a protracted court battle that ultimately went to the
94. In other words, we do not consider union democracy to be the goal of the RICO trusteeship. We believe that union democracy, especially competitive elections and accountability, are indicia that the union is no longer under organized crime control and that democratic processes make it less likely, albeit hardly impossible, that organized crime could regain control. Cf. Eric Ames Tilles, Union Receiverships Under RICO: A Union Democracy Perspective, 137 U. PA.L. REV. 929 (1989).
95. N.J. STAT. ANN. �� 5:12�1 to �210 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003).
96. See THE EDGE, supra note 2, at 75 (noting that the opening of each new casino brought between 1,500 and 2,000 new members into Local 54).
97. Id. at 76.
99. Id. Later, Scarfo became boss of the Philadelphia family. Id. at 78.
100. Id. at 79.
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U.S. Supreme Court,102 Gerace and the others resigned their ofﬁces.103
Meanwhile, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation concluded in 1984 that mob interests controlled Local 54 and exerted �substantial influence� over the HEREIU International union.104 During the course of the committee�s three-year probe, thirty-four union officials and reputed mobsters took the Fifth Amendment.105 The Senate report found that the dental plans for the Atlantic City and Las Vegas locals had outrageously excessive administrative costs (of 40�45 percent in contrast to 10�15 percent for similar plans in the private sector), parts of which were kicked back to LCN figures.106
Following the release of the Senate subcommittee�s report, the secretary of labor charged HEREIU International General President Edward Hanley and other top HEREIU officials with financial mismanagement in connection with HEREIU�s dental benefit program for foodservice workers in Atlantic City.107 In addition, in September 1985, the secretary of labor sued the dental benefit fund, the fund administrator, the pension fund trustees, and various service providers, but not the union itself or any of its officials, alleging that Hanley and other HEREIU leaders violated ERISA by signing a sweetheart contract for the Local 54 dental plan.108 In April 1988, the HEREIU Welfare Fund trustees agreed to the entry of two consent decrees, settling DOL�s two lawsuits.109 The HEREIU Welfare Fund received $3.85 million from the union.110 But the pension fund trustees were not personally liable, did not have to resign, and did not admit to any of the complaint�s allegations.111
On December 19, 1990, the DOJ ﬁled a civil RICO suit against Local 54, HEREIU President Edward Hanley, nine current and former officers of Local 54, ten individuals associated with the Bruno/Scarfo family, and, nominally, Local 54�s affiliated benefit plans and severance fund.112 The suit alleged twenty years of labor racketeering by the
102. Brown v. Hotel and Rest. Employees and Bartenders Int�l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
103. THE EDGE, supra note 2, at 80. Local 54 then employed Gerace as a �consultant.� Id.
104. S. REP. NO.. 98�595, at 7 (1984).
106. Id. at 8.
107. See THE EDGE, supra note 2, at 77�78.
108. See id. at 78�79; Brock v. Frank Gerace, Civ. No. 85�3669 (D.N.J. 1985).
109. HEREIU Welfare Fund Announces Settlement, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 8, 1988, LEXIS, PR Newswire ﬁle.
112. The named individual defendants were Edward T. Hanley; Francis Gerace (former president of Local 54 and then administrative aide to HEREIU General President Edward Hanley); Roy Silbert (president of Local 54); Felix Bocchiccio Jr. (vice president of Local 54); Thelma Hilferty (secretary-treasurer of Local 54); Daniel Diadone (member of Local 54�s executive board); Anthony Staino Jr., (member of Local 54�s executive board); Joseph Erace (former business agent of Local 54); Karlos Lasane (business agent of Local 54); Eli Kirkland (organizer of Local 54); Lawrence Smith (administrator of the HEREIU Local 170 Welfare Fund, a predecessor to Local 54�s dental and severance plan); Nicodemo Scarfo (alleged boss of the Bruno/Scarfo family, at the time serving concurrent life and fifty-five year sentences for a 1989 RICO conviction involving murder and extortion and a 1989 murder conviction); Anthony Piccolo (a.k.a. �Tony Buck,� cousin of Nicodemo Scarfo and alleged associate of the Bruno/Scarfo family); Nicodemo Salvatore Scarfo; Albert Daidone (former vice president of Local 54 and an alleged associate of Angelo Bruno, former boss of the Bruno/Scarfo family; convicted in 1984 of the 1980 murder of John McCullough, the former president of Roofers Local 30, and serving a life sentence); Ralph Natale (former secretary-treasurer of Local 170, a predecessor union to Local 54, and an alleged member of the Bruno/Scarfo family); Philip Leonetti (nephew of Nicodemo Scarfo and former underboss of the Bruno/Scarfo family, currently serving a forty-five year sentence on a 1989 RICO conviction for murder and extortion); Lawrence Merlino (former capo of the Bruno/Scarfo family, currently serving a life sentence for a murder conviction); Frank Materio (former organizer for Local 54 and an alleged associate of the Bruno/Scarfo family); Frank Lentino (former business agent and ofﬁce manager for Local 54 and an alleged associate of the Bruno Scarfo family; convicted of paying bribes to Atlantic City Mayor Michael Matthews in 1984); and Raymond Martorano (alleged member of Bruno/Scarfo family, convicted with Albert Daidone for the murder of John McCullough and currently serving a life sentence). United States v. Edward T. Hanley, No. 90�5017 (GEB) (D.N.J. 1990) (HEREIU Compl.).
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Bruno/Scarfo family.113 The consent decree that settled the RICO suit enjoined most of the defendants�all those alleged in the complaint to be LCN members or associates�from permanently participating in the affairs of the Local; some members were enjoined from participating for seven to ten years.114 The decree called for a court-appointed monitor with authority to investigate, audit, and review all facets of Local 54�s and its affiliate benefit plans� operations.115 The monitor would sit on the Board of Trustees of the HEREIU International Union Welfare and Pension Funds, with full rights of a trustee and specific authority, if necessary, to petition the court to protect the rights of Local 54 members.116 President Hanley agreed not to take any action involving Local 54 without the prior consent of the monitor, not to impede the monitor, and affirmatively to assist the monitor.117 In April 1991, the court appointed as monitor James F. Flanagan III, former deputy director of the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement.118 The decree called for his term to last six years.119 Local 54 elections, scheduled for June 1991, were postponed; the monitor would hold secret ballot elections as soon as �an open democratic climate� was restored.120
Through his experience as New Jersey�s deputy director of Gaming
114. Consent decree, United States v. Edward T. Hanley, No. 90�5017 (GEB) (D.N.J. 1991) [hereinafter Hanley consent decree].
118. Flanagan, supra note 23.
119. Hanley consent decree, No. 90�5017 (GEB) . It ended on schedule in March 1997. Flanagan, supra note 23.
120. Hanley consent decree, No. 90�5017 (GEB); Flanagan, supra note 23.
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Enforcement, Flanagan came to his new job with knowledge of the Bruno/Scarfo family and Local 54.121 He was briefed by Assistant U.S. Attorneys and DOL and FBI investigators whom he knew from previous investigations.122 For the first four months of the trusteeship, DOL agents stayed with Flanagan at the Local 54 offices during working hours because of concern that LCN would try to intimidate him.123
From the beginning, Flanagan attempted to win the support of the rank and ﬁle.124 He promised the membership that he would open his own mail at the Local�s headquarters.125He encouraged union members to contact him by telephone or in person and set up a post ofﬁce box in another town.126 He held special meetings, also attended by DOL agents, to discuss the trusteeship�s progress.127 He also published a column in the Local�s quarterly newsletter.128
In Flanagan�s view, the main objective of the trusteeship was to bring democracy to Local 54.129 With the labor racketeers barred from participating in the union, Flanagan could concentrate on stimulating membership participation in union affairs.130 Restoring democracy was to be accomplished by free and fair elections, a fair process for handling grievances, and the termination of sweetheart collective bargaining agreements.131
Flanagan initially had only one staff member, a lawyer, who had previously worked for the National Labor Relations Board.132 The International union, with Flanagan�s approval, assigned two officials to Local 54 for one year to focus on identifying administrative problems and addressing the routine bread-and-butter trade union issues.133 Flanagan hired Michael Holland, formerly elections officer in the IBT
121. Flanagan, supra note 23.
123. Id. The DOL remained actively involved in this trusteeship until its conclusion.
131. Id. In one particularly egregious example of a sweetheart contract, Local 54 had contracted with a company to supply computers to the local. Id. Although the HEREIU International had offered to supply computers free of charge, the local still bought computers from the company, which were often worth only about 10 percent of their retail price. Id. It was later discovered that the company was owned and operated by several LCN members. Id. One of Flanagan�s first moves was to dissolve the contract with the company and allow the International to supply the Local with computers. Id. The company sued Flanagan in an attempt to enforce the contract, but the suit ended with a settlement favorable to Flanagan. Id. When the company sued the trustee, DOJ brought a civil RICO countersuit against the company, which disappeared thereafter. See Tedco Computer Servs. v. Local 54, Hotel Employees and Rest. Employees Int�l Union, No. 91� 3052 (D.N.J. 1991).
132. Flanagan, supra note 23.
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International case, as a consultant.134 Finally, he hired an accounting firm to do a quarterly review and annual audit of the Local.135
The civil RICO suit forced eight officers and members out of the union.136 Flanagan did not undertake any disciplinary actions to remove other members, but he did scrutinize everyone seeking union ofﬁce.137 Flanagan did not have the power to expel members from the union, only to forbid members from running for and holding union ofﬁce.138 He found eight candidates to be associates of organized crime figures and barred them from the 1993 election.139
Flanagan mainly concentrated on holding free and fair elections.140 Prior to the civil RICO ﬁling, there had not been a contested election for more than ten years.141 During this period, no more than 5 percent of the 15,000 members voted in any election.142 In the lead-up to the 1993 election, all candidates had to undergo FBI and DOL background checks; a grievance procedure was formulated to deal with election disputes.143
In the first election, held in 1993, there were three LCN-controlled slates.144 Flanagan ruled all three slates ineligible based on LCN connections uncovered through the FBI and DOL background checks.145 Some candidates appealed to Judge Brown.146 Judge Brown reviewed Flanagan�s decisions according to an �arbitrary and capricious� standard�and on five occasions DOL agents working on the investigation submitted affidavits to Judge Brown establishing the organized crime association or connection that provided the basis for ruling the individuals ineligible.147 Under the agreement with the DOL agents, Judge Brown sealed the affidavits from the public; no evidentiary hearings were held.148 The candidates appealed the decision to seal the affidavits, but the Third Circuit affirmed.149 Approximately 3,400 members,
136. Hanley consent decree, No. 90�5017 (GEB).
137. Flanagan, supra note 23.
138. Hanley consent decree, No. 90�5017 (GEB).
139. Flanagan, supra note 23; see also Hanley, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22192; Hanley consent decree, No. 90�5017 (GEB). 140. Flanagan, supra note 23. 141. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP�TOF LABOR, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,APRIL1�SEPTEMBER30, 1996, at 33 (1996) [hereinafter DOL REPORT].
143. Flanagan, supra note 23; see also Hanley, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22192.
145. Flanagan, supra note 23; see also Hanley, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22192. Federal investigators taped Natale�s phone conversations from Danbury Prison and used the evidence to disqualify Natale�s preferred candidates. Id.
146. See Hanley, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22192.
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or 22 percent of the eligible membership, voted in the election.150 Flanagan and the DOL agents held an all-night session to count the votes in front of the membership, hoping to show their commitment to union democracy and real reform.151
In the August 1996 election, over ninety candidates competed for union ofﬁce, including four candidates for president; not one candidate was alleged to have an association with organized crime. This time, approximately 5,098, or 33 percent of the union membership, voted.152 All the incumbents were defeated.153 An entire leadership transition had been accomplished.
When the trusteeship ended in 1997, the union appeared to be operating successfully.154 A 1997 audit showed a surplus of more than $1.3 million in the local�s treasury, in contrast to the $625,000 deﬁcit in 1990.155
The trusteeship had lasted six years.156 For the first one-and-a-half years, Flanagan worked at the Local three to four days a week.157 After the 1993 election, the new leadership started to run the union, and the monitor�s role decreased.158 During the last one-and-a-half years, Flanagan was again at the Local more often, in part because of responsibilities related to the 1996 election.159 Flanagan�s fees, and all the fees of the trusteeship, were paid by Local 54.160 Flanagan was paid $180 per hour, billing about $20,000 per month on average�about twenty-five to twenty-eight hours per week.161 In the seventy-one months of the monitorship, Flanagan�s bills were never challenged by the parties.162
There are several factors that may account for the Local 54 trusteeship�s success. Local 54 entered into the consent decree relatively early on in the government�s investigation and prosecution, which created a positive environment for the remedial effort�no bitter adversarial litigation between Local 54 and the government occurred. Additionally, HEREIU provided important assistance by assigning two competent and committed union officers to aid the court appointed
150. DOL REPORT, supra note 141, at 33.
151. Flanagan, supra note 23.
152. DOL REPORT, supra note 141, at 33.
153. Flanagan, supra note 23.
154. Two rounds of fair and untainted elections had been held. There had been a complete break with the clique that had controlled the local before the RICO suit. Id.
155. Kathy Seal, Union Monitor Remains, HOTEL &MOTEL MGMT., Apr. 7, 1997.
156. Flanagan, supra note 23.
161. Seal, supra note 155.
162. Flanagan, supra note 23.
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trustee in the re-democratization of the union.163 Additionally, the demographics of Local 54 were good for remediation: the membership of the Atlantic City local was comparatively diverse and fluid; this meant that a significant percentage of the membership was not emotionally committed to or scarred by the old regime.164
B. An Unsuccessful Trusteeship: Roofers Local �30/30B, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
In 1988, when the government brought a civil RICO case against the Union, it represented approximately 2,000 persons employed in roofing work in eastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, and Delaware.165 The Union had two parts: Local 30 represented employees of commercial roofers, while Local 30B represented employees of residential roofers.166 These locals were affiliates of the United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association, the international roofers union.167
Corruption and racketeering pervaded Local 30/30B, of the United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association since at least the late 1960s. From the late 1960s through the 1970s, Local 30 was headed by John McCullough, who was a close associate of Philadelphia LCN boss Angelo Bruno.168 McCullough ran the union for the benefit of the Bruno crime family.169 On March 21, 1980, Bruno was assassinated by a faction unhappy with his leadership.170 Eventually, Phil Testa emerged as boss of the Philadelphia family.171 Testa tried to convince McCullough to let his prot�g�’s control a new union local for Atlantic City casinos� security personnel, but McCullough refused.172 On December 16, 1980, McCullough was murdered at home in the presence of his wife.173
With McCullough gone, various LCN factions fought to control Local 30/30B. On March 15, 1981, Phil Testa was assassinated by a remote controlled bomb hidden under the porch of his duplex.174 The
163. Robert C. Stewart, Letter to the Editor, Voice of the Bar: Local 560 Prosecutor Rebuts Criticism of Trusteeship, N.J.L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at 25.
165. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1142.
166. Id. at 1143.
168. See GUINTHER&FRIEL, supra note 24, at 66 (�McCullough and Bruno, I learned, had not only been partners in crime; they genuinely seemed to like one another.�).
169. See id. at 62�66.
170. Id. at 39.
171. Id. at 25.
172. Id. at 67 (�During the early fall of 1980, [Testa] had two�by one account, three�meetings with Big John in which he advised him that it would be to everyone�s interest if he backed off from his Atlantic City activities.�).
173. Id. at 46.
174. Id. at 25�26.
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bomb was packed with roofing nails and explosives.175 Underboss Pete Casella and capo Frank Narducci blamed the attack on the Philadelphia roofers union, but the two men were later determined to have been behind the assassination.176 Another power struggle ensued; this time, Nicodemo �Little Nicky� Scarfo, a capo based in Atlantic City, became the boss of the Philadelphia LCN family.177
Backed by Scarfo, Stephen Traitz was installed in 1981 as the new head of Roofer�s 30/30B.178 From September 1985 through February 1986, the FBI, by means of a bug, conducted electronic surveillance of Local 30/30B�s business ofﬁces.179 The intercepted conversations led to criminal RICO charges against thirteen union officials, including Traitz.180 The evidence showed that Traitz did jobs for Scarfo, such as collecting debts and resolving disputes between labor unions and LCN-affiliated contractors.181 Scarfo exercised influence over Local 30/30B affairs and activities and signed off on various acts of union violence against contractors and members of other unions.182 On November 23, 1987, a federal jury found thirteen officers and employees of the Roofers Union guilty of conducting and participating in the affairs of the Roofer�s Local through a pattern of racketeering activity, and guilty of RICO conspiracy; bribery of federal, state, and local public officials; mail fraud; extortion; illegal kickbacks; embezzlement from union benefit plans; and collection of debts for organized crime.183
The U.S. Attorney almost immediately followed up the criminal RICO case with a civil RICO suit naming as defendants the same men convicted in the criminal RICO case.184 In a hearing for a preliminary injunction, the government presented its evidence in three parts.185 First, it presented the testimony of fifty witnesses who �described improper and/or illegal acts allegedly committed by the individual defendants and/or the Union and/or members or supporters of the Union.�186 Second, the government presented approximately eleven audiotapes culled from the voluminous electronic evidence presented in the criminal
176. Id. at 148.
177. Id. at 82.
178. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1157.
179. Id. at 1154�55.
180. Id. at 1155. These are Stephen Traitz, business manager; Edward P. Hurst, president; Michael Mangini, business agent; Robert Crosley, business agent; Michael Daly, recording secretary and business agent; Daniel Cannon, dispatcher and business agent; Mark Osborn, organizer; Robert Medina, business agent; Ernest Williams, business agent; James Nuzzi, organizer; Stephen Traitz III, organizer; Joseph Traitz, organizer; and Richard Schoenberger, organizer. Id.
181. Id. at 1157.
183. Id. at 1141.
185. Id. at 1142.
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RICO trial.187 Third, the government presented the testimony of University of Pennsylvania law professor Clyde W. Summers, a prominent labor scholar who specializes in union democracy.188 The government�s requested injunctive relief included removal from ofﬁce of Local 30/30B officers, chosen by Traitz, elected after the old officers were convicted and sentenced to prison;189 the government also asked that Local 30/30B be placed under a court-appointed trustee.190 In opposition, the attorneys for the Roofers asked Judge Louis C. Bechtle to deny injunctive relief or �at most to impose some sort of limited monitorship whereby the current officers would continue to run� the Local.191 The judge granted a limited �decreeship,� along the lines the defendants desired.192
Judge Bechtle ordered a financial audit of the union and its associated benefits funds.193 All thirteen of the civil RICO defendants were barred for life from any participation in the roofing industry.194 Judge Bechtle left the Local�s newly elected officers in place while attempting to limit or excise their control over certain union functions, particularly collective bargaining which had been marked by racketeering and violence in the past.195 Judge Bechtle hoped that focusing on remedying improper practices, not people, would reform the union while respecting its autonomy.196 The judge explained that as long as the Local
189. Id. Roofers Local 30/30B held elections on December 21, 1987, to replace those leaders who were convicted in the November 1987 criminal RICO suit. Id. at 1160. This was the first contested election in nearly twenty years, with dissident Mike Sullivan running a slate. Id. at 1143. Sullivan and his supporters were subject to work-related reprisals as well as verbal and physical threats and vandalism. Id. at 1160. Despite Sullivan�s efforts, when 1,046 of the 1,500 eligible members voted, they overwhelmingly selected the slate that had close ties to the convicted leaders. Id. at 1160�61. The new business manager was the brother of one of the convicted leaders, and many others on the slate had either worked with, or directly for, others among the thirteen defendants. Id. at 1159. It must be noted that the �new leadership� to which Judge Bechtle referred had been �elected� only days before the start of the trial. Opposition candidates had been barred from the union, removed from shop steward positions; those union members who dared to challenge the clique were threatened with violence and accosted when they attempted to hand out election literature. Id. at 1160. The board that was eventually installed was comprised of longtime associates of the convicted officials. Id. at 1161. It reappointed all of the business agents who had served under the old regime. Id.; see also Goldberg, Cleaning Labor�s House, supra note 8, at 981.
190. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1142.
193. Id. at 1169.
194. Id. (�The court intends that the Decree assure that former convicted defendants play no part in this Union from any position of influence.�).
195. Id. at 1168.
196. Id. (�[T]here must be a blend that will both (a) accommodate the requirement that the court provide a strong remedial role in the functioning of Local 30/30B short of a trusteeship; and (b) demonstrate a tolerance for the existence, during this period, of Local 30/30B as a labor Union operating as a meaningful, necessary institution that the membership can truly belong to, be a part of, have a voice in, be loyal to, and be led by persons chosen through a genuine democratic process within the Union.�).
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functioned in a lawful manner, he would respect its autonomy, but that he would not tolerate violence, extortion, intimidation, and any meddling by the individuals convicted in the criminal RICO case.197
Acknowledging that Local 30/30B�s officers were, to some extent, Traitz�s prot�g�’s, Judge Bechtle recognized that there was a risk in leaving the union�s officers in power.198 He noted that the newly elected board members, �following the conviction of the previous leaders . . . rather than repudiate the old regime, embraced it, supported it, and marched for it.�199
I am sure there are membership influences that have carried some degree of loyalty from the past into the present. This was not unexpected. It has been the court�s view that a certain amount of that has to be tolerated and dealt with effectively. The most effective solution to that will simply be the passage of time. A new generation of membership functioning under lawful procedures will make that effort an unnecessary and unattractive alternative for a growing membership and hence, not a significant factor. 200
As court liaison officer (CLO), Judge Bechtle chose Robert Welsh, a former law clerk who had served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia from 1980 to 1986 and as chief of the Philadelphia office’s major crimes section from 1984 to 1986.201 The CLO was to function more as an observer than as a reformer.202 Judge Bechtle ordered that face-to-face collective bargaining sessions had to contain equal numbers of union representatives and employer representatives unless the CLO agreed to the deviation.203 The CLO was required to be present at any face to face negotiations.204 At such negotiations, the CLO could participate in the content or direction of the meeting, so long as there was no violence or intimidation.205 No collective bargaining agreement would take effect until the CLO investigated and signed off.206
At the beginning of his trusteeship, Welsh worked as CLO for an average of ten hours a week, but this slowly subsided to about two hours a month by the end of the trusteeship.207 He spent most of that time
197. Interview with Judge Louis C. Bechtle, Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Aug. 12, 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author).
198. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1168.
200. Bechtle, supra note 197.
201. MARTINDALE HUBBLE, MARTINDALE HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, available at
202. Telephone interview with Robert Welsh, Special Master, Roofers Local 30/30B, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Feb. 4, 2004) (notes on ﬁle with author).
203. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1172�73.
206. Id. at 1173.
207. Welsh, supra note 202.
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monitoring transactions, interviewing people who were reported to have connections with racketeering, talking to people within the roofing industry, and supervising negotiations.208 There was no shortage of people to step forward to provide Welsh with information; as he comments, �[p]eople reached out. Everybody wanted to talk, wanted to manipulate the situation. Dissidents, contractors, industry insiders, owners of buildings where roofing was being done, each one was trying to play an angle.�209
One of Welsh�s most time-consuming tasks was trying to sort out the structural problems that existed between the Local 30 commercial roofers section and the Local 30B residential roofers group.210 The existence of Local 30B created a �permanent underclass of residential roofers.�211 Those who worked in residential roofing were usually smaller operators who were coerced through violence and threats to sign union contracts, while still collecting less than half of what the commercial roofers in Local 30 were collecting.212 The result of this was that the racketeers maintained two separate unions, one with high-price workers, and one with low-price workers. Employers who paid off were permitted to sign contracts with the low-rate union, a typical mob labor racketeering tactic. Welsh ended this species of racketeering by combining the two unions.213
The inadequacy of the decree and the CLO�s powers was crystal clear as early as the June 1989 election. Welsh required mail balloting because �although the members have been courteous and respectful to me, there has been a pattern of intimidation directed at those perceived to be exercising their lawful political rights.�214 The Traitz connected leadership preserved by the decree was reelected by a two-to-one margin.215 The campaign was characterized by intimidation as usual.216 At a membership meeting two months before the election, officers whipped the crowd into such a frenzy against the opposition slate that those candidates had to be escorted out.217 Welsh observed the event, but lacked authority to take action; he later explained that �a group of reformers tried to make political changes, and suffered mightily for it. I couldn�t help them much, because they were labeled dissidents, and therefore were subject to difficulties getting jobs.�218
210. Id.; see also Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1163.
211. Welsh, supra note 202.
214. Lisa Ellis, Mail Ballot for Roofers Is Proposed, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 6, 1989, at B5.
215. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor�s House, supra note 8, at 983.
216. Id. 217. Id. 218. Welsh, supra note 81.
450 The Labor Lawyer 450 (2004)
During the 1990s, Welsh�s role as CLO appears to have been relatively passive, as it was designed to be.219 He did monitor meetings, sign checks and contracts, and generally oversaw the union�s compliance with the decree,220but without a permanent staff or power to bring disciplinary charges, and with the U.S. Attorney�s Ofﬁce on the sidelines, he was unable to initiate investigations of continued mob influence in the union. While several rounds of procedurally proper elections did take place, there was no decisive break with the old regime or a significant change in the culture of the union.
At Welsh�s request, Judge Bechtle terminated the decreeship on September 28, 1999, stating �[t]he time is now for this court to step aside . . . It�s about time for the union to function free of the shadow of the court.�221 However, Judge Bechtle did reaffirm the provision that effectively barred the former officials who had originally been convicted of RICO charges from playing any role in union activities.222 Welsh called Local 30/30B a �flagship local for the national union.�223 Indeed, the Local�s reputation was so rehabilitated that the International ordered five moribund roofers locals to combine with Local 30/30B.224
Although Judge Bechtle had ordered the monitorship of the union itself to end, the court�s authority over the individual defendants remains indefinite.225 One year later, on October 24, 2000, Robert Welsh was once again in front of Judge Bechtle in his capacity as monitor over those defendants� activities within the union, this time asking to investigate reports that some of the former officers who had been banned for life from union activities were once again trying to influence its internal affairs.226 While Judge Bechtle granted his request that subpoenas be issued, Welsh was unable to develop a case that any of the original defendants had returned to power within the union.227
More problems surfaced in the spring of 2003. An investigation by the International revealed instances of physical violence, threats of violence, and extortion at job sites.228 The International became concerned
220. Telephone interview with Robert Welsh, Court Liaison officer, Roofers Local 30/30B in Philadelphia, Pa. (Feb. 17, 2004) (notes on ﬁle with author).
221. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Judge Revokes Court Scrutiny of Roofers Local 30 After 11 Years, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 28, 1999, at B01.
222. Id. See also United Union of Roofers v. Composition Roofers Union, Local 30, 2003 WL 21250627, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2003).
223. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Roofer�s Union Gets New Scrutiny, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 2000, at B1.
224. Id. Then business manager Thomas Pendrick noted that the value of Local 30/30B�s benefit funds had topped $120 million; just ten years before, the funds had been on the verge of bankruptcy. Pendrick, a union vice president, was appointed to work with other troubled locals around the country.
225. Welsh, supra note 220.
226. Slobodzian, supra note 221, at B1.
227. Welsh, supra note 220.
228. United Union of Roofers, 2003 WL 21250627, at *3.
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 451
about reports of financial malpractice and mismanagement, unauthorized reductions in Local 30/30B�s initiation fees, and the failure of the Local board to fulfill its duties, such as not properly investigating reports of extortion at job sites.229 Based upon its investigation, the International put Local 30/30B under trusteeship on March 21, 2003.230 When the trustee appointed by the International union attempted to enter the Local 30 ofﬁce, union officers refused to allow him to take control of the premises, withholding keys and security codes to the building.231 At that point, the International took the Local to court.232 On March 26, 2003, U.S. District Judge Franklin S. Van Antwerpen granted the International�s request to impose a trusteeship for up to eighteen months.233 With little advancement in union democracy, and a return to racketeering as usual, we consider the Local 30/30B decreeship not to have been successful.
Judge Bechtle left the incumbent officers in place out of respect for union democracy. In so doing, he missed the true problem. Replacing incumbents does not destroy union democracy where there is no democracy to destroy. Allowing those who were undemocratically selected to continue in their positions does not foster democracy. As labor scholar Clyde Summers states, �Stephen Traitz was not chosen by the members of the Roofers Local, but by the Maﬁa, and he served the Mafia’s purposes. The new officers were not freely chosen by the members, but were chosen by convicted officers and elected in a climate of intimidation produced by pervasive violence and denial of job rights.�234 By allowing those who were illegally selected to remain in power, Judge Bechtle indulgently affirmed the control of the racketeers.
The Roofer�s decreeship suffered from its own half measures. Not four months after the ﬁling of the decree, a law student commentator correctly predicted that it would be a failure.235 By taking half measures, trying to balance the desires of the union with the needs of justice, Judge Bechtle doomed the decree. For example, critics of the decreeship make the point that while no face-to-face bargaining can take place without the CLO, the CLO has no power to participate in the bargaining. Additionally, critics point out that measures such as limiting the number of union representatives at such bargaining has little impact�there were almost 100 contractors present at the Rifle Club
232. Id. An accountant who examined Local 30�s records testified that over the course of one year revenue dropped $31,096.00 while expenses increased $518,125.00. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Judge Extends Union Trusteeship, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 27, 2003, at B8.
233. United Union of Roofers, 2003 WL 21250627, at *7.
234. Summers, supra note 8, at 694.
235. Tilles, supra note 94, at 948.
452 The Labor Lawyer 452 (2004)
meeting when a small group of union leaders, McCullough and Traitz primarily, began their reign of terror��the court does not address in its decreeship the problem of enabling the �terrorized� victims of the union leadership to exercise the rights they had prior to the decree. Why will individuals report incidents to the liaison officer that they would not report to the police?�236
The U.S. Department of Justice�s use of civil RICO to eradicate entrenched organized crime labor racketeering ought to be considered a major chapter in American law enforcement history and in American labor history. At least twenty civil RICO suits have so far been ﬁled, three of them against international unions. In every case, the government has succeeded in obtaining, by order or consent decree, a court-appointed trustee, monitor, or court liaison officer. But these �trustees� have been differently empowered, financed, and tenured. Some have plugged away at their mission for more than a decade; others have expired after just eighteen months. Some have expelled dozens of union officers; others have expelled nobody. Some have assumed administrative control over the union; others have functioned only as �cops.� Some appear to have succeeded brilliantly in bringing forth a new leadership cadre unrelated to the faction that corruptly dominated the union for decades; others have failed to free the union from the labor racketeers.
Do the civil RICO suits and court-appointed trustees provide a solution to �mobbedup� labor unions, only a partial solution, or no solution at all? Remarkably, after twenty years of massive legal effort, there is no clear answer. Indeed, very little is known about the nature and progress of these trusteeships or about how to evaluate them. In seeking to analyze the civil RICO union suits as a whole, this article draws together disparate information and presents new information as well. It provides a kind of progress report on where things stand after twenty years of litigation and trustee-initiated remediation. While a definitive evaluation requires a longer time frame and a bigger study, this article demonstrates that so far the results of the civil RICO suits and trusteeships are mixed. There have been major successes and major failures. There are many ongoing cases whose success or failure is not yet clear.
In addition to offering a progress report, this article constitutes a plea for more research. The ongoing experiment in attempting to reform corrupted unions by means of civil RICO suits and court appointed trustees is a vitally important experiment in organizational change and reform that will be of interest to policymakers charged with attacking organizational corruption in the United States and other
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 453
countries in years to come. We must determine what has worked and what hasn�t in order to perfect this strategy of reform.
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the research unit of the Department of Justice, seems to us the logical agency to take responsibility for comprehensively researching and evaluating the civil RICO labor racketeering litigation. The trustees need to be completely debriefed and their experiences placed �on the record.� Their reports need to be brought together and archived. The trustees themselves should be brought together at a number of workshops or conferences where they can share, compare, and debate their experiences. Finally, the NIJ staff itself should undertake a systematic analysis of best practices. All that at least would constitute a solid start on giving the RICO union trusteeships the kind of saliency that a law enforcement �experiment� of this magnitude deserves.
454 The Labor Lawyer 454 (2004)
TABLE I : Civil RICO Suits Against “Mobbed-Up” Unions
TABLE I : Civil RICO Suits Against “Mobbed-Up” Unions
|TABLE I: Civil RICO Suits Against ��Mobbed-Up�� Unions|
DATE FILED, DISTRICT COURT
PUBLISHED OPINIONS DISCUSSING VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE CASE
1. United States v. Local 560, Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 82689
March 9, 1982, D.N.J.
United States v. Local 560, Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, 550 F. Supp. 511, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2984 (D.N.J. 1982), later proceeding at 581 F. Supp. 279, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2829 (D.N.J. 1984), aff �d, 780 F.2d 267, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2121 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2368 (1986). See also United States v. Sciarra, 851 F.2d 621, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2878 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Local 560, Int�l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 694 F. Supp. 1158, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2690 (D.N.J. 1988), aff �d, 865 F.2d 252, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2856 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1068, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2856 (1989); United States v. Local 560, Int�l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 736 F. Supp. 601, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2807 (D.N.J. 1990),findings of fact/conclusions of law at 754 F. Supp. 395, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2165 (D.N.J. 1991), aff �d, 974 F.2d 315, 141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001 (3d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter the Sciarra cases].
2. United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, No. 86 Civ. 4819
June 19, 1986, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2540 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
3. United States v. The Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, Philip Rastelli, et al., No. 872974 (IBT Local 814)
August 25, 1987, E.D.N.Y.
United States v. The Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); 695 F. Supp. 1426 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff �d, 879 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1989).
4. United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, et al., No. 87 Civ. 7351
October 15, 1987, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 705 F. Supp. 894, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2533 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff �d, 889 F.2d 1232, 132 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2978 (2d Cir. 1989); 55 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1995).
5. United States v. Local 30, United Slate Tile and Composition Roofers, et al., No. 877718
December 2, 1987, E.D. Pa.
United States v. Local 30, 686 F. Supp. 1139, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2580 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff �d, 871 F.2d 401, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3058 (3d Cir. 1989).
6. United States v. John F. Long, John S. Mahoney, et al., No. 5588 Cr. 943 (IBT Locals 804 and 808)
May 1988, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); 917 F.2d 691, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2812 (2d Cir. 1990).
7. United States v. Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486 [hereinafter the IBT International case]
June 28, 1988, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2161 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 723 F. Supp. 203, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2707 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 725 F. Supp. 162, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2801 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 728 F. Supp. 1032, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2281 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); 899 F.2d 143, 133 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2827 (2d Cir. 1990); 905 F.2d 610, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3161 (2d Cir. 1990); 907 F.2d 277, 134 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3172 (2d Cir. 1990); 931 F.2d 177, 137 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2022 (2d Cir. 1991); 941 F.2d 1292, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2219 (2d Cir. 1991); 964 F.2d 180, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2022 (2d Cir. 1992).
8. United States v. Locals 18041, 824, 1809, 1909, 1588 and 1814, Int�l Longshoremen�s Ass�n, et al., No. 90 Civ. 0963*
February 14, 1990, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Local 18041, International Longshoremen�s Ass�n, 745 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); 812 F. Supp. 1303, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2533 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 44 F.3d 1091, 148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2217 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2001 (2d Cir. 1995).
9. United States v. Local 295, Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 90CV0970
March 20, 1990, E.D.N.Y.
United States v. Local 295, Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, 1991 WL 35497 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); 1991 WL 340575 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); 784 F. Supp. 15, 141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2625 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
10. United States v. District Council of NYC and Vicinity of the United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, et al., No. 90 Civ. 5722
September 6, 1990, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. District Council of NYC and Vicinity of the United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 778 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); 941 F. Supp. 349, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
11. United States v. Edward T. Hanley, et al., No. 905017 (HEREIU Local 54)
December 19, 1990, D.N.J.
United States v. Hanley, 1992 WL 684356 (D.N.J. 1992).
12. United States v. Anthony R. Amodeo, Sr., et al., No. 92 Civ. 7744 (HEREIU Local 100)
October 23, 1992, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2226 (2d Cir. 1995).
13. United States v. Local 282 of the Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 942919
June 21, 1994, E.D.N.Y.
United States v. Local 282 of the Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters, 13 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
14. United States v. Mason Tenders District Council of Greater New York, No. 94 Civ. 6487
September 7, 1994, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Mason Tenders District Council of Greater New York, 1994 WL 742637 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 909 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); 909 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
15. United States v. LIUNA (International Union �voluntarily� instituted reforms in exchange for government notﬁling signed consent agreement)
Serpico v. Laborers� Int�l Union of North America, 97 F. 3d 995, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2577 (7th Cir. 1996).
16. United States v. Edward T. Hanley, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int�l Union, and Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union General Executive Board, Civ. No. 954596
September 5, 1995, D.N.J.
United States v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int�l Union, 974 F. Supp. 411 (D.N.J. 1997); Agathos v. Muellenberg, 932 F. Supp. 636, 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2509 (D.N.J. 1996).
17. United States & Laborers� Int�l Union of North America v. Construction & General Laborers� District Council of Chicago & Vicinity, No. 99C 5229
August 8, 1999, N.D. Ill.
Laborers� International Union of North America v. Caruso, 1999 WL 14496 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff �d, 197 F. 3d 1195, 163 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2204 (7th Cir. 1999).
18. United States v. Laborers� Int�l Union of North America Local 210, No. 99 CV0915A
November 18, 1999, W.D.N.Y.
Panczykowski v. Laborers� Int�l Union of North America, 2000 WL 387602, 166 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2110 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); Caci v. Laborers� Int�l Union of North America, 2000 WL 387599, 166 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2232 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
19. United States v. Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int�l Union Local 69
April 17, 2002, N.D.N.Y.
20. United States v. Locals 18041, 824, 1809, 1909, 1588, and 1814, Int�l Longshoreman�s Ass�n, No. 90 Civ. No. 0963
February 14, 1990, S.D.N.Y.
United States v. Local 18041, 745 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); 812 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 44 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173 (2d Cir. 1995).
21. United States v. ILA Local 1588
United States v. Local 18041, Int�l Longshoremen�s Ass�n, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1105 (S.D.N.Y., Jan 29, 2003); United States v. Local 18041, Int�l Longshoremen�s Ass�n, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1229 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 30, 2003); United States v. ILA Local 1588, 77 Fed. Appx. 542, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18062 (2d Cir. 2003).
*This lawsuit resulted in three separate court-appointed trustees for ILA Locals 1814, 1588, and 1909.
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 457
|TABLE II: Derivative Trusteeships Imposed by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Laborers� International Union of North America|
INTERNAL TRUSTEESHIPS IMPOSED ON LOCALS
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)
IBT Local 738 (Chicago, IL)
August 1993 STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, THE TEAMSTERS: PERCEPTION AND REALITY, confidential Appendix Vol. II, 406 (2002).
IBT Local 813 (New York, NY)
September 1993 STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra at 391.
IBT Local 363 (Howard Beach, NY)
December 1993 Letter from Charles M. Carberry, Chief Investigator, International Brotherhood of Teamsters Independent Review Board, to James Jacobs (Nov. 19, 2003) (onﬁle with author).
IBT Local 732 (Queens, N.Y.)
January 1994Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 819 (Elmherst, NY)
February 1994 Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 966 (New York, NY)
April 1994Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 107 (Philadelphia, PA)
October 1994 STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra at confidential Appendix Vol. I, Tab 29.
IBT Local 807 (Long Island City, NY)
March 1995 STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra at confidential Appendix Vol. II, 545�46.
IBT Local 320 (Minneapolis, MN)
May 1995Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 138 (Queens, NY)
June 1995Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 97 (Union, NJ)
August 1995Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 875 (Elmherst, NY)
October 1995Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 186 (Ventura, CA)
October 1995Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 390 (Hollywood, FL)
February 1996 Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 1205 (Melville, NY)
March 1996Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 714 (Berwyn, IL)
August 1996General president imposed an emergency trusteeship, during which new hiring practices were adopted to prevent referral abuses. STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra at confidential Appendix Vol. II, 475.
IBT Local 745 (Dallas, TX)
August 1996Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 107 (Philadelphia, PA)
August 1996Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 240 (Bronx, NY)
January 1997Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 398 (Rochester, NY)
January 1997Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 240/966 (Cresskill, NJ)
February 1997 STIER, ANDERSON & MALONE, LLC, supra at confidential Appendix Vol. I, tab 32.
IBT Local 398 (Rochester, NY)
February 1997 STIER, ANDERSON & MALONE, LLC, supra at 470.
IBT Local 815 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ)
November 1999 Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 806 (Garden City, NY)
February 2000 Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 239 (East Meadow, NY)
February 2000 Carberry, supra.
IBT Joint Council 69 (Indianapolis, IN)
April 2000Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 572 (Carson, CA)
September 2000 Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 857 (Sacramento, CA)
October 2000Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 840 (New York, NY)
December 2000 Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 244 (Cleveland, OH)
October 2001Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 676 (Collingswood, NJ)
March 2002Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 901 (San Juan, PR)
June 2002Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 456 (Elmsford, NY)
November 2002 Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 522 (Jamaica, NY)
January 2003Carberry, supra.
IBT Local 531 (Yonkers, NY)
October 2003Carberry, supra.
| || || |
460 The Labor Lawyer 460 (2004)
TABLE II: Derivative Trusteeships Imposed by the Laborers� International Union of North America (Continued )
|TABLE II: Derivative Trusteeships Imposed by the Laborers� International Union of North America|
INTERNAL TRUSTEESHIPS IMPOSED ON LOCALS
Laborers� International Union of North America (LIUNA)
LIUNA Local 423 (Columbus, OH)
August 1994.Correspondence from Robert Luskin (Nov. 2003) (onﬁle with author).
LIUNA Local 1278 (St. John, NB)
February 1995, for financial misappropriation. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 73 (Stockton, CA)
March 1995, for financial wrongdoing, insolvency, poor record keeping. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 853 (Houston, TX)
July 1995, for financial irregularities and insolvency. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 210 (Buffalo, NY)
February 1996; DOJ petitioned court for an appointed monitor in December 1999, and LIUNA agreed. Organized crime involvement. Judge Considers Overseer for Union Local, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at B8.
LIUNA Local 427 (Sioux City, IA)
July 1996, for financial insolvency. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 225 (Chicago, IL)
March 1997, for organized crime involvement. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 479 (Tucson, AZ)
March 1997, for financial misconduct. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 101 (Winnipeg, MB) (Now known as LIUNA Local 1258)
April 1997Luskin, supra.
Virginia/North Carolina District Council
May 1997, for financial malfeasance and misappropriation. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 495 (Lawton, OK)
June 1997, for financial insolvency. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 612 (Oklahoma City, OK)
July 1997, for financial insolvency. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 445 (Brooklyn, NY)
October 1997, for financial irregularity and dual unionism; organized crime involvement. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 388 (Yorktown, VA)
February 1998, for financial wrongdoing and insolvency. Luskin, supra.
Chicago Laborers District Council (CLDC)
February 1998, for organized crime involvement, financial malfeasance, and lack of democratic procedures. Note: a civil RICO lawsuit was jointlyﬁled by DOJ and LIUNA on August 11, 1999, resulting in court supervised trusteeship. United States of America and Laborers� International Union of North America by and through Robert Luskin, in his official capacity as General Executive Board Attorney v. Construction & General Laborers� District Council of Chicago and Vicinity, an affiliated entity of the Laborers� International Union of North America, 99 C 5229 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 8 (Chicago, IL)
March 1998, for organized crime involvement. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 958 (New York, NY)
March 1998, due to organized crime involvement, financial malfeasance, and dual unionism. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 93 (San Antonio, TX)
June 1998, for financial irregularities. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 703 (Champaign, IL)
June 1998, for financial irregularities and lack of democratic practices. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 325 (Jersey City, NJ)
February 1999 Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 52 (Norfolk, VA)
March 1999, for violations of the Constitution and financial irregularities. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 2 (Chicago, IL)
May 1999 NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE, May 27, 2002.
LIUNA Local 673 (Newport, RI)
October 1999 Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 1077 (Charlottetown, PEI, Canada)
October 1999, for financial irregularities. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 80 (Houston, TX)
August 2000, for financial irregularities. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 86 (Denver, CO)
March 2001, for financial wrongdoing. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 438 (Atlanta, GA)
October 2001, for failure to administer jurisdiction, keep proper records and conduct business in an orderly fashion; and Equal Employment Opportunity and sexual harassment violations. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 652 (Santa Ana, CA)
April 2002, to eradicate corruption, restore democratic practices, and restore conduct of legitimate objectives of LIUNA. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 91 (Niagara Falls, NY)
May 2002, due to indictment of principal operating officers. Luskin, supra.
Texas District Council
August 2002, to restore financial stability and improve record keeping practices. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 1268 (Sacramento, CA)
September 2002, to correct financial malpractice and restore democratic practices. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 1082 (El Monte, CA)
January 2003, for financial irregularities, violation of the job referral rules, and lack of democratic procedures. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 1154 (Wilmington, DE)
January 2003, for financial irregularities, failure to maintain union records, and lack of cooperation with organizing activities. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 1073 (Columbus, GA)
April 2003, for financial irregularities. Luskin, supra.
LIUNA Local 1175 (Howard Beach, NY)
April 2003, for financial irregularities and obstruction of the GEB attorney. Luskin, supra.
| || || |
The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 463
TABLE III: Trustee Backgrounds
|TABLE III: Trustee Backgrounds|
Eugene R. Anderson
LIUNA Local 6A (New York)
Assistant U.S. Attorney and partner in NYC law firm. Interview with Eugene Anderson (Aug. 5, 2002) (notes onﬁle with author).
Robert E. Bloch (Trustee)
Chicago Laborers� District Council (CLDC)
Labor lawyer, Dowd, Bloch & Bennett. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE, Aug. 16, 1999.
John A. Boardman (Deputy Monitor)
HEREIU Local 69
HEREIU vice president; served as temporary trustee of Local 69 (appointed by Wilhelm when Wilhelm put the Local under trusteeship in March 2002). Formerly president of a HEREIU local in Washington. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE, Mar. 18, 2002.
Charles Carberry ( Investigations Officer)
Assistant U.S. Attorney, 1979�1985; deputy chief, Criminal Division, 1985�1986; chief, Securities and Commodities Frauds Unit, 1986�1987, U.S. Attorney�s Ofﬁce, Southern District of New York. MARTINDALE HUBBLE, MARTINDALE HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, available at http://martindale.com (2002).
Michael Chertoff (Investigations Officer)
Mason Tenders District Council (MTDC)
Assistant U.S. Attorney for Southern District of New York, 1983�87;first Assistant U.S. Attorney for District of New Jersey, 1987�1990; U.S. Attorney for District of New Jersey, 1990�1994; U.S. Senate special counsel for Whitewater Committee, 1994�1996; partner at Latham & Watkins, 1994�2001; assistant attorney general, Criminal Division, 2001�2003; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 2003. Interview with Michael Chertoff (March 2003) (notes onﬁle with author).
Kenneth Conboy (Investigation and Review officer)
New York District Council of Carpenters; also Elections officer in IBT International
U.S. district judge for the Southern District of New York; . former national appeals master for the Teamsters International nationwide election; NYC commissioner of investigation; counsel to commissioner of NYPD. Latham & Watkins, LLP, Attorney Biographies, available at http://www.lw.com/attorney.
Ronald E. DePetris (Independent Supervisor)
IBT Local 851
Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York, 1982�1986; Assistant U.S. Attorney, chief of Fraud Section and chief of Criminal Division, Eastern District of New York, 1971�1977. MARTINDALE HUBBLE, MARTINDALE HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, available at http://martindale.com (2002).
W. Neil Eggleston (Appellate Officer)
Chief of Appeals, U.S. Attorney�s Ofﬁce in the Southern District of New York; former Clinton White House attorney. Administration�s Efforts Against the influence of Organized Crime in the Laborer�s International Union of North America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 199203 (1996) (statement of Robert D. Luskin, LIUNA GEB Attorney) [hereinafter Hearings].
James Flanagan, III
HEREIU Local 54
Deputy director of the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement. Telephone interview with James Flanagan (July 2002) (notes onﬁle with author).
Robert W. Gaffey
ILA Local 1588
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, U.S. Attorney�s Ofﬁce, 1985�1988. Chief counsel to the investigations officer in the IBT International trusteeship. MARTINDALE HUBBLE, MARTINDALE HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, available at http://martindale.com (2002); James Jacobs & Ellen Peters, Labor Racketeering: The Maﬁa and the Unions,30 CRIME AND JUSTICE 229, 270 (2003).
Stephen B. Goldberg (Election officer)
Professor of law at Northwestern University; expert in alternative dispute resolutions; served as an attorney for the National Labor Relations Board, 1961�1965. Hearings, supra.
W. Douglas Gow (Inspector General)
FBI associate deputy director: Investigations. Hearings, supra.
Steve Hammond (LIUNA trustee)
Started in LIUNA in 1970 as a member of Local 295 Salt Lake City; elected business manager of Local 295 in 1975; appointed assistant business manager of the Oregon/Southern Idaho/Wyoming/Utah District Council in 1987; came to LIUNA Int�l Headquarters in 1989 to serve as assistant director of the construction and jurisdiction dep�t; appointed director of the department in 1994. [After trusteeship] was assigned as special assistant to the general president (Coia) in 1997; served as cochairman and trustee on the NYS Laborers� Employers� Cooperation and Education Trust (LECET) until August 2003; was elected by the LIUNA GEB as international vice president at large in August 2000. Proﬁles: Steve Hammond: Helping Locals Stand Strong, N.Y. STATE LABORERS TRIFUND, available at http://www.nysliuna.org/trifund/Aug2003/proﬁles_hammond.html(Aug. 2003).
Michael Holland (Elections officer)
General counsel, International Union, United Mine Workers of America, 1982�1989; chairman and trustee, UMWA Health and Retirement Funds, 1993 through today. Chairman and trustee, National Organizers Alliance Retirement Pension Plan, 1997 to present. MARTINDALE HUBBLE, MARTINDALE HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, available at http://martindale.com (2002).
Frederick Lacey (Independent Administrator)
Chairman, U.S. Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, 1984�1986; member, Judicial Ethics Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 1983�1986; judge, Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, 1980�1986; judge, U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 1979�1985. MARTINDALE HUBBLE, MARTINDALE HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, available at http://martindale.com (2002).
Mary Shannon Little (Court officer)
HEREIU Local 100
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District New York. Interview with Mary Shannon Little (Nov. 2002) (notes onﬁle with author).
Robert D. Luskin (GEB Attorney)
Special counsel to the DOJ Organized Crime Racketeering Section. Hearings, supra.
LIUNA Local 210
Former FBI agent. Correspondence with Robert Luskin (Feb. 11, 2004) (onﬁle with author).
ILA Local 1588
NYPD police commissioner, 1978�83. Larry McShane, A Longshoremen�s Union Tries�Again�to Step Out of Mob Shadow, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 27, 2003.
Steven A. Miller (Court Appointed Monitor)
Chief, Special Prosecutions Section, U.S. Attorney�s Ofﬁce, Northern District of Illinois, 1991�1995; chief, Bank and Financial Inst. Fraud Unit, 1988�1991; House of Representatives, Special Council, Illinois. Matt O�Connor, Judge Names Two to Rid Union of Mob influence, CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1999, at 3.
Michael Moroney (Deputy Trustee)
IBT Local 295
Former federal labor investigator Tom Robbins, The Cleanup Man, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 24, 2001, at 22.
Kurt Muellenberg (Trustee)
HEREIU International and HEREIU Local 69
Former chief of the DOJ�s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. Interview with Kurt Muellenberg (Nov. 7, 2002) (notes onﬁle with author).
Howard O�Leary (Investigations Officer)
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Detroit; partner in the Washington ofﬁce of Dykema Gossett. Correspondence from Kurt Muellenberg (Feb. 2004) (onﬁle with author).
Lawrence Pedowitz (Court-Appointed Monitor)
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York, 1974�1978, chief of appeals, 1976�1977, and chief, Criminal Division, 1982�1984.Interview with Lawrence Pedowitz (Nov. 2002) (notes onﬁle with author).
Thomas Puccio (Trustee)
IBT Local 295
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York, 1969�1976 (chief, Criminal Division, 1973�1975; executive assistant U.S. attorney, 1975�1976); chief, U.S. Department of Justice Strike Force, 1976�1982. MARTINDALE HUBBLE, MARTINDALE HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, available at http://martindale.com (2002).
IBT elections officer, 1996; labor lawyer and partner in the law firm of Perry, Lerner, Quindel & Saks in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; regional coordinator for IBT officer elections, 1991. Hearings on Invalidated 1996 Teamster Election: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 254�60 (1997).
Gabriel Rosetti Jr.
LIUNA Local 210 (Buffalo)
Thirty-one year union member. Stephanie Mencimer, Ex-FBI official Pulls at Union�s Infamous Roots; Laborers Fight Corruption From the Inside Out, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998, at A1.
IBT Local 1588
Recently named deputy trustee in the IBT Local 1588 case; former head of the Federal Organized Crime Strike Force in Newark, New Jersey; former attorney with the Department of Justice, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section; prosecuted many major organized crime cases andﬁled the civil RICO suit against IBT Local 560, the first use of the RICO Act against a union dominated by organized crime. Correspondence from Robert Stewart (Feb. 9, 2004) (onﬁle with author).
Edwin H. Stier (Trustee)
IBT Local 560
Former Assistant U.S. Attorney in charge of the Criminal Division in the New Jersey ofﬁce; former director of the New Jersey State Division of Criminal Justice. STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, THE TEAMSTERS: PERCEPTION AND REALITY 367 (2002).
Daniel F. Sullivan (Chief Investigator)
Supervisor, FBI Baltimore ofﬁce. Correspondence from Kurt Muellenberg (Feb. 2004).
Henry Tamarin (Trustee)
HEREIU Local 100
HEREIU international vice president; also worked on HEREIU Local 54 trusteeship. Flanagan, supra.
Michael Tobin (Deputy Trustee)
IBT Local 295
Former investigator for Thomas Puccio; no labor background. Robbins, supra, at 22.
Peter F. Vaira (Independent Hearing Officer)
Executive director of President�s Commission on Organized Crime; former chief of DOJ�s Organized Crime Strike Force in Chicago; and former U.S. Attorney for Eastern District of Pennsylvania Hearings, supra.
Robert E. Welsh Jr. (Special Master)
Roofers Local 30/30B
Assistant U.S. Attorney, 1980�1986 and chief of Major Crimes Section, 1984�1986, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. MARTINDALE HUBBLE, MARTINDALE HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY, available at http://martindale.com (2002).
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The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 467
TABLE IV: Duration of Trusteeships
|TABLE IV: Duration of Trusteeships|
DATE TRUSTEESHIP ESTABLISHED
PROPOSED DURATION OF TRUSTEESHIP
TERMS FOR EXTENSIONS
IBT Local 560
June 23, 1986
February 25, 1999 STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, THE TEAMSTERS: PERCEPTION AND REALITY 382 (2002).
LIUNA Local 6A(Cement and Concrete Workers, New York)
April 6, 1987
Until elections held in 1990
March 31, 1993Twentyfirst Report of Trustee, United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, No. 86 Civ. 4819 (S.D.N.Y.) (Apr. 15, 1993).
Philadelphia Roofers Local 30/30B
June 2, 1988
September 28, 1999 Joseph A. Slobdozian, Judge Revokes Court Scrutiny of Roofers Local 30 After 11 Years, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 28, 1999, at B1.
Ongoing STIER, ANDERSON & MALONE, LLC, supra, at 342 (2002).
IBT Local 295
April 29, 1992
As of 2002, the trustee in charge recommended that while the local was ready for court supervised elections, his trusteeship should continue, in modified form, for at least seven more years.
Ongoing STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra, at 417.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America NY District Council and Constituent Locals
March 4, 1994
The decree provided for: �The internal review officer [to] apply to the court for an extension or to reduce the length of the term by six months or less, in order to complete work in progress, upon a showing of good cause and upon reasonable notice to the government and counsel for the District Council.� 1994 consent decree, section 9(a).
June 1999Consent decree, District Council of Carpenters (March 4, 1994); United States v. District Council, 778 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. District Council, 941 F. Supp. 349, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
HEREIU Local 54
April 12, 1991
March 3, 1997Interview with James Flanagan (July 2002).
HEREIU Local 100
October 23, 1992
Seems that there were unknown details
1995Interview with Mary Shannon Little (Nov. 2002) (notes onﬁle with author).
IBT Local 282
June 1, 1994
Yes, for four years, until May 2003; see amended consent judgment in 13 F. Supp. 2d 401
Ongoing United States v. Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 282, 13 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
IBT Local 851
A court order issued October 20, 2000, extended the trusteeship until thirty days after the second set of elections following the trusteeship, which were expected to be held in the fall of 2003.
Ongoing STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra, at 415.
December 27, 1994
Not extended; however, a �Supplemental� consent decree was entered into in January 1999 that provided that the trustee, Lawrence Pedowitz, would act as a review monitor� for another thirty-six months, with power to apply to the court for restoration of his trustee powers if he concluded the union was being run corruptly.
January 1999Interview with Lawrence Pedowitz (Nov. 2002) (notes on ﬁle with author).
February 15, 1995
February 11, 1998 (three years)
First one year extension from February 1998�January 1999 did not alter the agreement. Second one year extension was announced January 8, 1999, and weakened agreement a bit� DOJ will allow LIUNA to curtail its efforts to accommodate �budgetary constraints,� and DOJ can only impose consent decree if a failure to do so would �substantially interfere� with the purposes of the agreement, instead of at its discretion. Second extension was set to expire on January 31, 2000; on January 20, 2000, the agreement was replaced with a weakened agreement that expires in 2006. Unlike the prior agreement, the new deal has no takeover threat. DOJ now can only �veto� major changes in LIUNA�s reform effort, but cannot take over the union. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE, Jan. 31, 2000.
Set to terminate in 2006 NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE (Jan. 31, 2000).
September 5, 1995
Was extended for one year. Muellenberg requested extension in February 1997; court granted twelvemonth extension, with trusteeship ending March 5, 1998. After termination of trusteeship, Muellenberg continued as one member of a three person oversight committee with limited authority. Kurt Muellenberg, Federal Monitor�s Final Report as Monitor (2000).
March 8, 1998; Consent decree was not technically lifted until December 1, 2000, when all the disciplinary proceedings ended. Kurt Muellenberg, Federal Monitor�s Final Report as Monitor (2000).
Chicago Laborers� District Council
LIUNA trusteeship began February 1998;court ordered trusteeship began August 12, 1999
At least two years
Doesn�t appear that there were any explicit terms; there wasn�t an extension.
Consent decree lifted on August 30, 2001 NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE (Sept. 10, 2001).
LIUNA Local 210 (Buffalo, NY)
December 1999 (prior LIUNA internal trusteeship from February 1996� December 1999)
LIUNA appointed an internal trustee for a two year term; a monitor was also appointed by the court, at the DOJ�s request
In 1998, LIUNA extended the trustee�s term indefinitely. Stephanie Mencimer, Ex-FBI official Pulls at Union�s Infamous Roots; Laborers Fight Corruption from the Inside Out, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998.
August 2001 Interview with Robert Luskin (Feb. 2003) (notes onﬁle with author).
HEREIU Local 69
April 17, 2002
ILA Local 1588
January 29, 2003
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470 The Labor Lawyer 470 (2004)
TABLE V: Trustee Powers for Selected Trusteeships
|TABLE V: Trustee Powers for Selected Trusteeships|
IBT Local 560
� Trustee had �all authority and power to act as he may, in his good judgment, seeﬁt to administer the affairs and fulfill all of the responsibilities of Local 560.� � Trustee powers included, but were not limited to, all of the powers previously held by Local 560�s officers and executive board members. � Power to negotiate contracts. � Power to pursue grievances.� Power to conduct organizing campaigns.� Power to litigate and defend claims. � Power to hire andﬁre employees; as well as set wages and terms of employment.� Power to appoint or remove shop stewards. � Power to retain or terminate legal counsel. STIER, ANDERSON & MALONE, LLC, THE TEAMSTERS: PERCEPTION AND REALITY 363�64 (2002) (quoting Order Appointing Trustee �3, Local 560 (Civ. No. 82689) (June 23, 1986)).
LIUNA LOCAL 6A
� Trustee did not run the union; only supervised the work of union officers. However, could countermand almost any decision made by the officers, including all expenditures by the union. � Trustee could remove anyone whom he believed had engaged in racketeering conduct or knowingly associated with an LCN member or anyone else enjoined from participating in the union. � Trustee could veto any expenditure of union funds or gift of union property approved by any officers � Trustee could prevent any Local 6A member from entering into a contract on behalf of Local 6A. This veto authority didn�t extend to collective bargaining agreements.� Trustee had right to solicit applications for new members to Local 6A; any reasonable expenses were borne by Local 6A. Trustee was solely responsible for determining whether an applicant was accepted for membership.� Even in areas where trustee did not have veto authority, trustee could review all proposed actions to be taken by or on behalf of Local 6A. Trustee could block action for seventy-two hours and seek review of it by the court. � Trustee had complete access to all books and records; authority to attend all meetings, visit and inspect job sites, take and compel sworn depositions, and have an independent auditor perform an audit once a year. � Empowered to distribute materials to membership of Locals 6A, 18A, 20, 1175. Cost of distribution borne by Local 6A and the District Council. � Trustee had final authority on how to conduct elections, supervised the balloting process, and certified the election results. � Trustee could hire any personnel necessary to assist him, but had to first submit and get prior approval by the court of a budget and cost estimates for such services. Personnel paid by Local 6A.
Roofers� Local 30/30B
Robert E. Welsh Jr.
� The court established direct control of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Union that require the expenditure of any funds of the Union or any affiliated entity for the transfer of any of its assets, and all defendants are enjoined, effective with the date of this decree, from transferring any funds, property, or interests in any assets of any kind of Local 30/30B or any of its affiliated entities, except in the ordinary course of business without the express previous written consent of the court � To the extent that collective bargaining was face-to-face (as opposed to by phone), it could only take place at a location designated by a court liaison officer (CLO). � The CLO was not permitted to designate as the location for any face-to-face negotiating session any property owned, occupied, or controlled by Local 30/30B or any affiliated entity. � A face-to-face negotiation was considered void and in violation of the decree unless at all stages there was a CLO there. The CLO could not participate in the content, except where the CLO determined that the conduct included an inducement of fear, intimidation, threats, or violence, which was reported to the court. � Every collective bargaining agreement, or renewal thereof, would not be effective until it was countersigned by the CLO, who, prior to execution, assured himself and certified to the court that the agreement was entered into after good faith negotiations and not in an atmosphere of fear, intimidation, threats or violence. � Any CLO had the right, without prior notice, to access any records, wherever located, at the offices, locations, and other property of Local 30/30B; and such CLO could designate other persons responsible to the CLO to have similar access. Such access included the right to inspect, copy, and reproduce where the CLO deems such activity is necessary. United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Ass�n, 686 F. Supp. 1139, 1171�74, 128 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2580 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
IBT International, trustees for the first election
Frederick Lacey, Charles Carberry, and Michael Holland
Independent Administrator:� Take disciplinary action, including suspension or termination of membership, against any corrupt union official. � Veto appointments of union officials. � Veto expenditures of any union funds used to further racketeering.� Is invested with all the disciplinary powers of the general president. Investigations officer: � Broad power to investigate corruption.� Power to bring disciplinary charges before independent administrator. Elections officer: � Power to supervise direct, rank-and-file secret ballot election for union�s top officers. JAMES B. JACOBS, BUSTING THE MOB 172�73 (1995).
NY District Council of Carpenters
� Had the authority to investigate the operation of the District Council and its locals, bring disciplinary charges against officers and members of the District Council and locals, veto certain decisions, recommend to the court changes in certain areas of the operations of the District Council, supervise implementation of the job referral rules, and supervise the 1995 District Council Elections. � The IRO also had the same right to initiate disciplinary charges against any member of the District Council and its constituent locals as has any officer or member of the District Council and its constituent locals. The IRO could commence a disciplinary proceeding byﬁling a charge in accordance with the procedures set forth in the decree. The IRO could present evidence at disciplinary hearings before the Independent Hearing Panels. Consent decree, District Council of Carpenters (Mar. 4, 1994); United States v. District Council, 778 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. District Council, 941 F. Supp. 349, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
HEREIU Local 54
James Flanagan III
� Monitor had the power to investigate, audit, and review all aspects of Local 54 and its affiliate benefit plans. � Monitor or designee sat on the Board of Trustees of the HEREIU International Union Welfare and Pension Funds with full rights of a trustee and specific rights to petition the court to protect rights of Local 54 members. � Hanley (HEREIU International President) was prohibited from taking any action involving Local 54 without the prior consent of the monitor. Consent decree, United States v. Edward T. Hanley, No. 905017 (D.N.J. 1990).
HEREIU Local 100
Mary Shannon Little (court officer) and Henry Tamarin (trustee)
� Court officer had the power to investigate alleged corruption and oversee the actions of the trustee; investigate alleged misconduct by employers under collective bargaining agreements with Local 100; supervise and assist trustee in recovering assets of Local 100; review the books and records of Local 100 and refer possible criminal law violations to law enforcement; and subpoena witnesses and documents and take testimony under oath. � Trustee had the authority to administer, supervise, and conduct the daily affairs of Local 100, and numerous other powers in regard to the appointment and election of officers and employees of Local 100, the marshaling of the union�s assets, the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, the supervision of the union�s finances, and other matters. Consent decree, United States v. Anthony R. Amodeo Sr., 92 Civ. 7744 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
IBT Local 851
� Power to investigate corruption and abuse within Local 851, with or without probable cause, and with such investigative assistance as he deemed appropriate. Could also interview members; subpoena witnesses and documents; take testimony informally or take testimony formally on the record before a court reporter. � Power to hire, appoint, retain, and discharge legal counsel, accountants, consultants, investigators, and any other personnel necessary to assist in the proper discharge of the independent supervisor�s duties. � Power to observe and be present at negotiations with employers, but not participate.� Power to discipline and remove any officer, administrator, organizer, business agent, employee, shop steward, lead agent, negotiator, or trustee for just cause based upon corruption or conduct listed in the consent decree. Consent decree, United States v. Int�l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 851 (consent decree reached before ﬁled) (Sept. 12, 1995).
Mason Tenders� District Council (MTDC)
� Monitor had the authority to impose sanctions for violation of injunctions; to exercise review and oversight authority over all expenditures and investments of the MTDC; to review all contracts or proposed contracts on behalf of the MTDC (except collective bargaining and any decision to strike); to review all appointments to MTDC ofﬁce or employment with any constituent local of the MTDC; to challenge the implementation of any proposed change to the Constitution of the MTDC; to call meetings of the MTDC; and to develop educational and training programs. � Monitor had the right to attend every meeting of the MTDC, as well as unfettered access to all books, records, correspondence,ﬁles, etc. � Monitor had the right to take and compel sworn statements of officers, agents, representatives, employees, members of MTDC; right to compel the accounting of assets of MTDC. � Monitor had the right to authorize civil actions on behalf of MTDC. � Monitor had the authority to discipline, fine, suspend, and expel members, officers, agents, representatives, and employees. � Monitor empowered to supervise all phases of the rank-and-file secret ballot elections of the Executive Board of the MTDC. � Monitor could communicate with membership through publications; could make any application to the court for assistance. Consent decree, United States v. Mason Tenders District Council of Greater New York, No. 94 Civ. 6487 at 7�17 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Chicago Laborers� District Council (CLDC)
Robert E. Bloch; Steven A. Miller
� Bloch administered the daily operations of the CLDC and was given the power to conduct elections. � After the election, the trustee had his title changed to Supervisor and supervised the actions of the elected officials. � Miller had authority to investigate and bring charges against members with LCN ties. Consent decree, United States of America and Laborers� International Union of North America by and through Robert Luskin, in his official capacity as General Executive Board Attorney v. Construction & General Laborers� District Council of Chicago and Vicinity, an affiliated entity of the Laborers� International Union of North America, 99 C 5229 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
HEREIU Local 69
� Court appointed monitor has broad powers to run and reform Local 69. Can remove Local 69 members or officials; investigate the union; approve and disapprove disbursements of Local 69 assets; review and take action upon collective bargaining agreements; refer matters to the U.S. Attorney�s Ofﬁce for investigation and potential criminal charges; and otherwise run and supervise the affairs of Local 69. Consent decree, United States v. Local 69 Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Int�l Union (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2002).
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The RICO TRUSTEESHIPS after TWENTY YEARS 475
TABLE VI: Success of Trusteeships
|TABLE VI: Success of Trusteeships|
ORGANIZED CRIME ASSOCIATES EXPELLED
ROUNDS OF COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS
IBT Local 560
Not only were members of organized crime expunged, but the consent decree terminating the trusteeship over the local maintains the ability to expel members who knowingly associate with organized crime members, or individuals previously expelled from the union.
In competitive elections held in December 1998, the pro-maﬁa Sciarra slate obtained only 20 percent of the vote, while a reform slate led by Pete Brown garnered 55 percent.
Success STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, THE TEAMSTERS: PERCEPTION AND REALITY 380�83 (2002).
LIUNA Local 6A
After the consent decree was signed, sixteen of the twenty-five officers of Local 6A and the District Council resigned their positions, but remained in the union. Nine defendants were allowed to keep their positions. Consent decree, United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, No. 86 Civ. 4819 (1987); A Little Law Called RICO, NEWSDAY, Mar. 20, 1987.
None up to 1990 (no history after 1990). The incumbents were viewed by the membership as part of the old regime (whether or not that is true isn�t clear), so they refused to challenge them in the 1987 elections. Eugene Kiely, Local 560: Proof Is in the Vote, THE RECORD, Nov. 27, 1988, at A2.
Philadelphia Roofers� Local 30/30B
Unclear�according to former Trustee Welsh, the election that was held in 1989 was both competitive and fair, due to mail-in balloting, yet the slate headed by Joseph Crosley (slate was known to have social, professional, and, in some cases, familial ties to fourteen criminally indicted former union officers) was reelected. Welsh also confirmed that, in his presence, union dissident Mike Sullivan had to be escorted from the building for his own safety when he tried to address a meeting. Sullivan was unsuccessful in two runs for business manager, and was eventually driven out of the union. Telephone interview with Robert Welsh, Special Master, Roofers Local 30/30B, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Nov. 25, 2003) (notes onﬁle with author).
Unsuccessful�on March 28, 2003, the Roofers International petitioned the court for a preliminary injunction, putting in their own trustee over the corrupt union. United Union of Roofers v. Composition Roofers Union, Local 30, 2003 WL 21250627 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2003).
Lacey acted as trier of fact and sentencing authority on almost 200 charges brought by Carberry. Lacey was more than willing to expel members who had maﬁa connections� �there is just one just and reasonable penalty to be imposed when a Union officer . . . seesﬁt to hobnob with mob bosses and underlings�permanent debarment from the very union he has tainted.� JAMES JACOBS, BUSTING THE MOB 175�76 (1995).
Changes to the IBT constitution made at the 2001 Convention incorporated the rules previously employed by the IRB to maintain democratic, non-corrupt elections. However, the new democratic elections put a premium on campaign financing, which led to the scandal that removed Ron Carey, one of the union�s first democratically elected leaders, from ofﬁce.
Provisional success; still pending STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra, at 339�41.
IBT Local 295
While during the beginning of the trusteeship some disciplinary action was taken against shop stewards and others, between 1998 and 2002, only limited disciplinary action had been taken.
As of June 2002, the trustee believes that Local 295 is ready for court supervised elections.
Probably unsuccessful A 2002 study by the Teamsters International suggests that remnants of organized crime are still in the local, with others waiting on the sidelines. STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra, at 417.
New York District Council of Carpenters
Between March 1996 and September 1996 alone, charges wereﬁled against seven union members for offenses such as assault and bribery.
The 1995 elections saw a reelection of organized crime associate Fredrick W. Devine. (That was the first rank-and-file election for the council�s officers in 121 years). Carpenters Re-Elect Devine, NEWSDAY, July 26, 1995, at A35.
Unsuccessful New indictments that came down in September 2000 resulted in the arrest of thirty-eight people, among them mobsters, contractors and union officials. The democratically elected District Council president, Michael Forde, was charged with taking bribes and falsifying business records in 1998�1999. Forde was elected in the last set of elections marking the end of Conboy�s trusteeship. The indictment charged that the Lucchese family reentered the business in the mid1990s, extorting contractors by promising protection from other mob families and by buying off corrupt union bosses. Barbara Ross & Greg Smith, Mob Extort Probe Nets 38 Arrests, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2000, at 6.
HEREIU Local 54
After the monitor was appointed, eight officers and employees of the union were forced from ofﬁce, but allowed to remain in the union.
Two: 1993 and 1996.
Success Interview with James Flanagan (July 2002).
HEREIU Local 100
Anthony R. �Chick� Amodeo Sr., president and business manager of Local 100 of HEREIU, and Anthony R. �Tony� Amodeo Jr., vice president of Local 100 of HEREIU, were enjoined from participating in the affairs of the Local. Consent decree, United States v. Anthony R. Amodeo, Sr., et al. 92 Civ. 7744 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Unclear how competitive�at end, Tamarin (the trustee) was elected to lead the Local, and reelected at the next election.
Substantially successful. Little�s last report to court said that there was no longer �even a hint of organized crime influence,� but this isn�t dispositive. Interview with Mary Shannon Little (Nov. 2002).
IBT Local 282
By 1996, three Local 282 stewards had been removed for committing acts of corruption and their association with Gambino LCN family members. Robert Henﬂing and onsite stewards Dominick Albaneses and Herman Schwall were removed from their positions by the corruptions officer.
Unclear OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP�T OF LABOR, 1996 REPORT, available at www.oig.dol.gov/public/reports/sar/sar0996/olr2.htm.
IBT Local 851
As of 2002, thirty-two members were disciplined and nine had either resigned or lost their membership.
Competitive elections held April 2001.
Success (�Given the deep entrenchment organized crime had for decades in . . . Local 851 . . . the combined actions of law enforcement,. . . Local 851�s monitorship and the Teamsters themselves must be viewed as an overall success.� STIER, ANDERSON &MALONE, LLC, supra, at 416.
Mason Tenders� District Council
One during trusteeship, in 1997. The election officer drafted election rules and addressed the members of the local regarding rules and procedures at a candidate workshop. Each prospective candidate had to be approved by the monitor prior to being nominated; in this regard, each had to complete a questionnaire and submit to investigation by the investigations officer (IO). The IO, together with agents from the FBI and DOL, reviewed the questionnaires and conducted investigations into each candidate. Sixteen of the approximately seventy candidates running were recommended to be disqualified; the monitor disqualified fifteen. United States v. MTDC, 1997 WL 340993 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Success Organizing efforts have doubled the MTDC�s membership to 12,000. The MTDC has implemented innovative safeguards to prevent corruption, such as its first certified steward�s program and FBI clearance to become a steward. The MTDC has recovered $12 million of the $15 million in assets lost by the membership because of the malfeasance of former officers and trustees. Says that Chertoff has expressed his confidence in LIUNA�s efforts to prevent organized crime from regaining influence. Impediments to Union Democracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employer Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 79�87 (1998) (statement of Michael S. Bearse, General Counsel, LIUNA).
By January 20, 2000, 226 individuals(127 of whom were alleged to have ties to organized crime (OC)) have left LIUNA either because of expulsion or because of retirement or resignation. LIUNA has imposed more than forty trusteeships and �supervisions� of various locals and subordinate entities for ties to OC, financial mismanagement, or lack of democratic processes. These trusteeships and supervisions have resulted in the removal of approximately 200 officers and the implementation of better financial management and greater democracy in these locals.
Unclear. Election monitor considered1996 general elections a limited success.
Substantially successful, though reports vary. See, e.g., Stephanie Mencimer, Ex-FBI official Pulls at Union�s Infamous Roots, WASH. POST, June 7, 1998.
Muellenberg permanently barred twenty-three individuals from participating in union affairs because of organized crime associations or failure to cooperate with the monitor, barred two individuals from participation in union affairs for thirteen years, and barred two individuals from holding a position of trust in the union for three years.
During his term as monitor, Muellenberg reviewed more than 1,064 candidates for election to local union ofﬁce, approved sixty-four elections, and postponed or invalidated three elections. Thirty-four individuals were charged with infractions of the consent decree, and all have been removed from or have agreed to vacate their union positions.
Substantially successful. However, there is concern about how well Wilhelm is instituting the reforms suggested by Muellenberg. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., Letter to Muellenberg, HERE Public Review Board Member, Aug. 30, 1999, at www.nlpc.org/olap/HERE/990830KM.htm.
Chicago Laborers� District Council
Bloch removed all former CLDC officers, instituted reform policies, and negotiated a new three year labor contract for the locals that provided for higher wages, better benefits, and, for the first time, a grievance procedure. Press Release, U.S. Dep�t of Justice, Consent Decree Allows Federal Court to Supervise Purge of Organized Crime from 19,000 Member Chicago Laborers� Council (Aug. 12, 1999).
Looks like a success. However, the very day the consent decree was lifted, Monitor Miller ﬁled internal union charges in court seeking to discipline two CLDC bosses who are the sons of Chicago LCN figures: Joseph Lombardo Jr. (ex-treasurer) and Anthony Solano, head of the CLDC�s training center. Jim McGough (Laborers for Justice) argues that the monitorship was a failure because all LCN elements weren�t removed. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE (Sept. 10, 2001).
LIUNA Local 210 (Buffalo)
Twenty-eight members were ejected in 1998.Association for Union Democracy, Laborer�s Coia Goes, All Else Remains, NEWSLETTER, Jan. 2000, at 3; Michael Beebe, Mob Led Union Needs Overseer, Court Is Told, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 2, 1999.
One (held one year after the trusteeship took effect).
Successful Correspondence from Robert Luskin (Feb. 11, 2004) (onﬁle with author).
HEREIU Local 69
HEREIU International put Local 69 into a union trusteeship, removed the officers, and appointed John A. Boardman as trustee in anticipation of the government�s suit. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE (Mar. 18, 2002).
Too soon to tell
ILA Local 1588
Unsuccessful John Timpanaro was installed as ILA Local 1588 president in January 2002, and by May 2002 was indicted on charges of racketeering and extortion. Larry McShane, On the Waterfront, in the Courtroom; Storied New Jersey Union Local Faces Another Racketeering Trial This Spring, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2004. On January 29, 2003, Federal Judge John S. Martin Jr. appointed former New York City Police Commissioner Robert McGuire to take over the union. NAT�L LEGAL AND POL�Y CTR., UNION CORRUPTION UPDATE (Feb. 3, 2003).
ILA Local 1814
Unsuccessful On June 3, 2002, seventeen members and associates of the Gambino crime family or officials of ILA Local 1814, including Local 1814 President Frank Scollo, were arrested and indicted with waterfront racketeering. The U.S. Attorney�s Ofﬁce, the New York State Attorney General�s Ofﬁce, and the FBI announced the arrests. The indictment included charges of placing maﬁa members in top union jobs and carrying out day-to-day extortion and loan sharking. James Jacobs & Ellen Peters, Labor Racketeering: The Maﬁa and the Unions, 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE 229, 270 (2003).
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COPYRIGHT 2004 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION http://bnabooks.com/ababna/laborlawyer/19.3.pdf
Web Published, with Author’s permission, in HTML format with hyperlinks to documents and newspaper articles by Laborers for JUSTICE, Jim McGough, as a service to the public and to union members who want RICO complaints and trusteeships to
- achieve their stated objectives and
- to install “union democracy”
- educate the members on union self governance
- end nepotism and cronyism in the appointment of provisional officers
- amend constitutions to require elections to fill vacancies in office.
Laborers for JUSTICE
Jim McGough, Director
2615 W Peterson Av
Chicago, Il 60659